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“At the end of the day, if the only successful ACOs are those from 
Geisinger, [Rochester, Minn.-based] Mayo Clinic and Kaiser Permanente, 
what has society gained? These organizations were already operating at the 
highest levels of confidence in respect to the triple aim.” 
-Marc Bard, MD, ACOs: The Least Agreed-Upon Concept in 
 Healthcare? via Becker’s Hospital Review (May, 2013) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A little more than four years after enactment of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”),1 daily headlines still abound on 
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newspapers and websites across the country highlighting both successes and 
failures of the ACA. Much of the public debate thus far has focused on those 
aspects of the ACA that address insurance reform,2 such as the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate,3 the launching of the healthcare 
exchanges,4 and enrollment of previously uninsured individuals into new 
insurance plans.5 While insurance reform is important and essential to 
                                                                                                                   
1 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 25 
U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.). 
2 See Jean Card, Trust Your Gut on Obamacare, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
(May 22, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/opinion-blog/2014/05/22/americans-
are-right-to-trust-their-gut-on-obamacare (stating “The Affordable Care Act was not 
healthcare reform, it was health insurance reform. And why would anyone understand that, 
when we generally don’t understand health insurance anyway?”). 
3 While the United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
“individual mandate,” which is that aspect of the ACA that requires individuals to purchase 
health insurance or otherwise face a tax penalty, there continues to be litigation surrounding 
this determination. See Sissel v. Dept. of Health and Human Srvs., 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (arguing that the ACA is unconstitutional because, to the extent that the 
requirement that individuals purchase health insurance is actually a tax, the bill that eventually 
became the ACA originated in the United States Senate in violation of the Origination Clause 
of the Constitution, which requires that all bills for raising revenue originate in the United 
States House of Representatives). 
4 Paul Demko, More Than Half of Companies Considering Private Exchanges, 
Survey Finds, MOD. HEALTHCARE (July 8, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/
article/20140707/BLOG/307079997 (finding that more than 50% of surveyed companies are 
considering sending employees to private insurance exchanges, and 23% of employers are 
likely to eliminate healthcare coverage altogether and instead direct their employees to the 
public exchange); David Blumenthal, M.D., M.P.P. & Sara R. Collins, Ph.D., Health Care 
Coverage under the Affordable Care Act—A Progress Report, NEW ENG. J. MED. (July 2, 
2014), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/in-the-
literature/2014/jul/1759_blumenthal_coverage_under_aca_progress_report_nejm_07_02_201
4_itl.pdf (estimating that twenty million individuals are now covered by insurance because of 
provisions under the ACA, consisting of one million individuals between the ages of 19–26 
who went on a parent’s policy, eight million individuals who purchased insurance off a federal 
or state insurance exchange, five million individuals who purchased insurance directly from 
an insurer, and six million individuals who enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP under expansion in 
certain states). 
5 There is debate as to whether the estimated eight million Americans who 
enrolled in private health coverage under the ACA in the first year of enrollment are those 
who were previously uninsured or those who opted for new insurance coverage on the 
exchanges. See Amit Bhardwaj et al., Individual Market Enrollment: Updated View, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar., 2014), http://healthcare.mckinsey.com/individual-market-enrollment-
updated-view) (exhibit three shows that as of March 31, 2014, an estimated 27% of 
respondents who purchased insurance on the health insurance exchange were previously 
uninsured, up from an estimated 11% of respondents being previously uninsured); but see Liz 
Hamel et al., Survey Of Non-Group Health Insurance Enrollees, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
(June 19, 2014), http://kff.org/health-reform/report/survey-of-non-group-health-insurance-
enrollees/ (finding that 57% of individuals who did not have group coverage who have 
purchased insurance on a state or national insurance exchange under the ACA were uninsured 
prior to purchasing their current plan). Irrespective of this dispute, about eight million 
Americans purchased insurance coverage from either state or federal exchanges set up under 
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understand (both as employers and for purposes of their own financial 
statements), for providers, suppliers, and other participants in the healthcare 
industry much of the dialogue and energy has been focused instead on those 
aspects of the ACA that address other types of reform of the healthcare 
system; specifically, the manner in which care is provided to patients and at 
what cost such care is provided.6 
In analyzing the stated goals of the ACA in its proposed reform of 
the healthcare delivery system, many such goals have their origins in a 
premise first proposed by Dr. Donald M. Berwick and the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (“IHI”) in 2006 referred to as the “Triple Aim.”7 
The Triple Aim is a framework for healthcare that, at its origin, was intended 
to “optimize population health, care experience, and cost.”8 Much of the 
impetus for this framework came about originally, and has managed to gain 
traction since its origin, in response to the fact that the healthcare system in 
the United States was then and continues to be today the most costly system 
in the world.9 Yet, many patient outcomes and patient satisfaction scores in 
the United States are nevertheless worse than in other developed nations.10 
Thus, recognizing key challenges unique to the U.S. healthcare system,11 IHI 
                                                                                                                   
the ACA in the first year of enrollment. See Enrollment in the Health Insurance Marketplace 
totals over 8 Million People, HHS.GOV (May 1, 2014) html [hereinafter HHS Press Release I], 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/05/20140501a.html. 
6 See William M. Sage, Putting Insurance Reform in the ACA’s Rear-View 
Mirror, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2014). 
7 See A History of IHI (“IHI”), INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, 
http://www.ihi.org/about/Documents/IHITimeline2013.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2015); see 
also Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, And Cost, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
759 (2008). 
8 See Berwick, supra note 7. 
9 Cathy Schoen, et al., Confronting Costs: Stabilizing U.S. Health Spending 
While Moving Toward a High Performance Health Care System, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 
10, 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2013/jan/confronting
-costs; see National Healthcare Expenditure Projections, 2012–2022, CMS.GOV, 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2012.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
10 See Berwick, supra note 7, at 759 (noting that despite spending the highest in 
the world on healthcare expenses relative to other developed countries, the U.S. ranks 31st on 
life expectancy, 36th on infant mortality, 28th on male healthy life expectancy, and 29th on 
female life expectancy (citing World Health Organization, World Health Statistics of 2006)). 
Note that some statistics have only worsened since the time of Berwick’s article. According to 
the World Health Organization, World Health Statistics of 2014, the U.S. now ranks thirty-
fifth in female life expectancy, thirty-fifth in male life expectancy, and thirty-second in overall 
life expectancy. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2014 60–66, 
available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/112738/1/9789240692671_eng.pdf?ua=1; 
see also Karen Davis, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 2014), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fund-report/2014/jun/1755
_davis_mirror_mirror_2014.pdf. 
11 The findings of IHI regarding the need for the Triple Aim is based on the 
assumption that the U.S. does not currently and will not under current reforms have a single 
payor system. See Berwick, supra note 7 at 767 (“[W]ith some risk, we note that the simplest 
way to establish many of these environmental conditions is a single-payer system, hiring 
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established a framework that is intended to optimize health system 
performance by focusing on the following three goals: (1) improving the 
patient experience of care (including quality and satisfaction); (2) improving 
the health of populations; and (3) reducing the per capita cost of healthcare.12 
Utilizing knowledge of the perceived failures of the managed care movement 
of the 1980s and 1990s,13 lawmakers and policy makers focused their 
reforms on the concept of the “Triple Aim,” which appears different from 
managed care reforms of the past because of its focus on achieving all three 
of its stated goals simultaneously, only one of which is cost containment.14 
While not specifically referenced as the “Triple Aim” in the actual 
text of the ACA, the themes and goals of the Triple Aim were prominent 
aspects of the dialogue and debate in both the U.S. Congress and at the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) in connection with the 
proposed reforms and process improvements under the ACA.15 For example, 
the ACA initiated the formation of the CMS Innovation Center, which stated 
goal is the “testing [of] various payment and service delivery models that 
aim to achieve better care for patients, better health for our communities, and 
lower costs through improvement for our healthcare system.”16 Probably the 
                                                                                                                   
integrators with prospective, global budgets to take care of the health needs of a defined 
population, without permission to exclude any member of the population.”). 
12 See The IHI Triple Aim, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, 
http://www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 28, 
2014). 
13 When health maintenance organizations (“HMOs”) initially emerged in the 
1980s, there was a proliferation of these types of organizations due in large part to the success 
that was being demonstrated regarding cost containment. HMOs then fell out of favor by 
the1990s, for various reasons, including concerns that insurers and providers sacrificed quality 
of care in order to achieve cost containment goals. David Muhlestein et al., The Accountable 
Care Paradigm: More than Just Managed Care 2.0, CTR. FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
INTELLIGENCE 8 (2013) [hereinafter Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm], available 
at http://leavittpartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Accountable-Care-Paradigm.pdf. 
14 Id. 
15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. §229b (2014) (stating 
that entities who may be eligible for awards from the Center for Quality Improvement and 
Patient Safety of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality will be judged by certain 
criteria including the provision of better care at a lower cost); id. § 1315a (2014) (establishing 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation and stating that some of the testing models 
will provide assistance to other healthcare institutions on how best to employ such best 
practices and proven care methods to improve healthcare quality and lower costs). See also 
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN AN ONLINE TOWN HALL ON 
HEALTH CARE (July 1, 2009) [hereinafter OBAMA REMARKS], available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-online-town-hall-health-care-
reform. 
16 See CMS Innovation Center, CMS.GOV http://www.innovation.cms.gov (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2015). In addition to the CMS Innovation Center, the ACA proposed various 
pilot programs and grant awards also with the goal of developing new systems that will 
achieve the Triple Aim, such as the Medicare Shared Savings Program (to be discussed at 
length in the remainder of this article), value-based purchasing programs, bundled payment 
programs, patient-centered medical home models, etc. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (hospital 
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most direct and obvious example in the ACA of a system process change that 
is focused on achieving the goals of the Triple Aim and emulating integrated 
delivery systems seemingly already achieving this balance is the formation 
and creation of accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) under the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”).17 The ACA states that the MSSP is 
intended to “promote[] accountability for a patient population and 
coordinate[] items and services under [Medicare] parts A and B, and 
encourage[] investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for 
high quality and efficient service delivery.”18 Many scholars have praised 
ACOs and ACO-like organizations19 as the best means for improving the 
quality and efficiency of healthcare in a manner that fulfills the Triple Aim 
because ACOs enable hospitals and physicians, as opposed to insurers, to 
“join forces” and work together to better coordinate the care of patients in the 
most cost effective and quality-driven manner.20 
One of the most common examples of efficiency and quality utilized 
during the debates leading up to enactment of the ACA was the world-
renowned Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota.21 Promoted as a model of 
the Triple Aim and exemplar for how ACOs should function, the Mayo 
Clinic was frequently cited by President Barack Obama as one of the 
institutions to which all other providers should look when considering reform 
of the U.S. healthcare delivery system.22 The Mayo Clinic is ranked first on 
                                                                                                                   
value-based purchasing program); id. § 256a-1 (2014) (establishing community health teams 
to support the patient-centered medical home. 
17 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj; see also Frank Pasquale, Accountable Care Organizations 
in the Affordable Care Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1372, 1374–75 (2012). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj. 
19 There are many organizations, sometimes referred to as clinically integrated 
networks, that have been established since the enactment of the ACA or pre-dating the ACA 
that have many of the same elements of an ACO, but do not meet the precise definition of an 
ACO as established by the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHS”) in enactment 
of regulations for the MSSP and thus are not participating in the MSSP. While many of the 
arguments made in this article regarding ACOs apply equally to ACOs and clinically 
integrated networks, this article will focus primarily on the structure that has been set up under 
the ACA for establishment of ACOs under the MSSP. 
20 See Pasquale, supra note 17 at 1374; Mark Morrell & Alex Krouse, 
Accountability Partners: Legislated Collaboration for Health Reform, 11 IND. HEALTH L. 
REV. 225 (2014). 
21 A search of the White House Press Office website reveals over 18 references to 
instances in which the President or other White House officials mentioned the Mayo Clinic in 
connection with healthcare or healthcare reform. See generally WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE, 
http://search.whitehouse.gov/search/news?utf8=%E2%9C%93&sc=0&query=%22mayo+clini
c%22&locale=en&m=&channel=6&affiliate=wh&commit=Search (last visited July 10, 
2014). 
22 See OBAMA REMARKS, supra note 15 (“We have long known that some 
places, including Minnesota, offer high-quality care at costs below average. (Applause) Look 
at what the Mayo Clinic is able to do. It’s got the best quality and the lowest cost of just about 
any system in the country. (Applause) So what we want to do is we want to help the whole 
country learn from what Mayo is doing.”); Letter from President Obama to Chairmen Edward 
M. Kennedy and Max Baucus (June 2, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/t
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the U.S. News and World Report Honor Roll for hospitals, and was listed as 
one of the top three hospitals in the country for nearly all of the specialties in 
which the publication ranks hospitals, including cancer; cardiology and heart 
surgery; diabetes and endocrinology; ear, nose, and throat; gastroenterology 
and GI surgery; geriatrics; gynecology; nephrology; neurology and 
neurosurgery; orthopaedics; pulmonology; and urology.23 Even as a top 
provider of healthcare in the nation (and, indeed, the world), the Mayo Clinic 
has also been lauded as being able to provide high-quality care without 
corresponding high spending.24 
To determine whether these assumptions regarding the Mayo Clinic 
and its role as a model for ACOs are true, it is necessary to examine the 
structure and regulations established for ACOs. ACOs are considered one of 
the primary means by which legislators and regulators intended for the U.S. 
healthcare system to move towards the Triple Aim,25 or said another way, 
look more like the Mayo Clinic. If the formation and adoption of ACOs is 
intended to make other hospitals, physicians, and other providers resemble 
those integrated systems promoted in 2009, and thus realize the Triple Aim, 
it is critical that the ACO regulations create a structure that is accessible and 
achievable for all types of providers across the delivery spectrum. As ACOs 
begin in earnest, and industry leaders also start the process of developing and 
                                                                                                                   
he_press_office/Letter-from-President-Obama-to-Chairmen-Edward-M-Kennedy-and-Max-
Baucus (“We should ask why places like the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, the Cleveland Clinic 
in Ohio, and other institutions can offer the highest quality care at costs well below the 
national norm. We need to learn from their successes and replicate those best practices across 
our country. That’s how we can achieve reform that preserves and strengthens what’s best 
about our healthcare system, while fixing what is broken.”); PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, 
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT MEETING WITH SENATE DEMOCRATS TO DISCUSS HEALTH CARE 
(June 2, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
meeting-with-senate-democrats-discuss-health-care (“So we’ve got to reform the underlying 
system. And this means promoting best practices, not just the most expensive practices. And 
one of the things I’m going to be discussing with the health and the finance committees is how 
can we change incentive structures so that, for example, places like Mayo Clinic in Minnesota 
are able to provide some of the best healthcare services in the country at half or sometimes 
even less of the costs than some other areas where the quality is not as good.”). 
23 In addition to being in the top three of each of these specialties, Mayo Clinic is 
the top hospital in pulmonology; neurology and neurosurgery; nephrology; gynecology; 
geriatrics; gastroenterology and GI surgery; ear, nose, and throat; and diabetes and 
endocrinology. See U.S. News Best Hospitals 2014–15, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. [hereinafter 
Best Hopsitals 2014–15], http://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/rankings (last visited July 
22, 2014). 
24 See Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum; see also Medicare 
Spending Per Enrollee, By State, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicare/state-
indicator/per-enrollee-spending-by-residence/ (last visited July 10, 2014) (citing Montana as 
the lowest cost per enrollee at $7,576 per enrollee, with Minnesota averaging $8,941 per 
enrollee, and New Jersey as the highest cost per enrollee at $11,903). 
25 See generally DAVID NEWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 9 (Nov. 4, 2010), available 
at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41474_20101104.pdf. 
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establishing national standards, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the 
U.S. health system cannot simply replicate the Mayo Clinic and Kaiser 
Permanente26 through the ACO models that have been enacted. While the 
goals of ACOs are consistent with the goals of the Triple Aim, the process of 
actually creating a system that is more integrated and coordinated like the 
Mayo Clinic and less like most other current (more fragmented and 
expensive) systems will require continued thoughtful analysis. 27 Such 
analysis must consider the ACO structure established under current 
regulations, which structure must continue to evolve if the U.S. healthcare 
system is ever to realize the Triple Aim. 
This article argues that in order to maintain the focus applied during 
the drafting and ultimate enactment of the ACA, and ensure that healthcare is 
provided in furtherance of the Triple Aim, the current ACO structure 
requires attention, direction, development, and ultimately amendment 
because it currently lacks applicability to those integrated systems that were 
intended to be leaders towards healthcare reform, such as the Mayo Clinic. 
Part II of this Article will describe the basis of the Triple Aim and the 
intended embodiment of the Triple Aim in the development of ACOs under 
the ACA. Part III will examine the Mayo Clinic and other integrated delivery 
systems to consider whether or not such systems, which have long been 
touted as beacons of quality and cost effectiveness, are already achieving the 
Triple Aim and further consider how these integrated delivery systems have 
responded to the ACO movement and their impact on participation or lack of 
participation in such movement. Part IV will examine some of the challenges 
of the current ACO structure as it exists today, focusing on Minnesota and 
the Mayo Clinic as a case study. It will further offer some recommendations 
for amendments to the ACO structure that will ensure that the healthcare 
delivery system that ultimately arises out of the ACO movement does not 
lose sight of the original goals of the Triple Aim, which can only be 
accomplished and achieved if the ACO structure is open and accessible to all 
providers, including academic medical centers (“AMCs”) and other 
integrated delivery systems.28 Finally, this Article will conclude in Part V by 
                                                 
26 Reed Abelson, The Face of Future Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/business/kaiser-permanente-is-seen-as-face-of-future-
health-care.html?_r=1& (Kaiser Permanente is a similarly touted system in California that is 
seen as a model of integrated care, which is able to maintain quality services, but without 
experiencing run-away healthcare spending). 
27 See Gawande, supra note 24 (comparing the Mayo Clinic and the high quality, 
low cost care that it is able to provide to its patients to the fragmented and highly expensive 
healthcare structure operating in McAllen, Texas). 
28 See generally John A. Kastor, Accountable Care Organizations at Academic 
Medical Centers, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 7 (Feb. 17, 2011); Melanie Evans, Beyond ACOs, 
MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 22, 2013) [hereinafter Evans, Beyond ACOs]; Justin Kearns, 
Rural Roads to ACOs: Inter-Community Collaboration is Key to Rural Accountable Care 
Organizations’ Success Under Medicare Shared Savings Program, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 425 
(2013). 
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noting that an ACO system that does not provide accessibility to all 
providers will ultimately be unsuccessful in achieving the Triple Aim 
envisioned under the ACA. 
II.  THE TRIPLE AIM AND THE ACA 
The Triple Aim is a concept that pre-dates the ACA and was 
developed in 2006 through the IHI.29 In response to consistently poor 
“scorecards” for the U.S. healthcare system,30 Berwick and the IHI believed 
there was a need to shift the paradigm of the delivery of healthcare in the 
United States in an effort to address the fact that the U.S. healthcare system 
“lacks the capacity to integrate its work over time and across sites of care.”31 
The Triple Aim focuses on meeting, simultaneously, three goals in the 
delivery of healthcare: “improving the individual experience of care; 
improving the health of populations; and reducing the per capita costs of care 
for populations.”32 As one can note from the continued use of the word 
“population,” the IHI emphasizes the need for this framework to be applied 
for all individuals receiving healthcare in the U.S.33 While each of the goals 
of the Triple Aim are important aspects of healthcare reform processes, 
Berwick believes that “the promise of equity” should be the most important 
policy consideration; that is, each of the aims must be pursued on parallel 
tracks34 and achieving the Triple Aim cannot mean providing improved 
outcomes to only a small subpopulation at the expense of another, but must 
contemplate better population health for all.35 
Much of Berwick’s premises and ultimate recommendations for 
reform are seeded by current ills of the U.S. healthcare system.36 Certainly, 
for some populations in the U.S., the healthcare system here is better than 
any other in the world, the Mayo Clinic being a prime example given its 
                                                 
29 See Berwick, supra note 7, at 760. 
30 See id. (citing Commonwealth Fund Commission on High Performance Health 
System in which U.S. scored an overall score of sixty six out of 100). Note that the U.S. 
scorecard from the Commonwealth Fund Commission on High Performance System has not 
improved with the U.S. scoring an overall score of 64 out of 100. See Why Not the Best? 
Results from the National Scorecard on U.S. Health System Performance, 2011, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2011
/oct/why-not-the-best-2011 (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). Note, however, that the report is 
based on data from 2007–2009, as an update from that last most recent data, and “does not 
fully reflect the effects of the recent economic recession on access to and use of care.” Id. It 
also fails to include whether any improvements have been made since the enactment of the 
ACA. Id. 
31 See Berwick, supra note 7, at 759. 
32 Id. at 760. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. Berwick has called pursuit of the Triple Aim as “an exercise in balance [to 
be] subject to specified policy constraints, such as decisions about how much to spend on 
healthcare or what coverage to provide and to whom.” Id. 
36 See Berwick, supra note 7, at 760. 
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international reputation for excellent care.37 As is demonstrated by the 
findings of the Commonwealth Fund, however, for others in this country the 
care that is provided, or at least the outcomes resulting from the care or lack 
of care to certain vulnerable populations, is worse than other developed or 
developing countries.38 In addition to the health disparities among certain 
subpopulations, certain models of care that have been utilized in the U.S., 
such as the managed care model, have focused on cost containment to the 
detriment of patient satisfaction.39 Thus, from Berwick’s perspective, it is not 
enough to succeed on one or two of the aims and it is also not enough for 
certain subpopulations of a few individuals to succeed in all three of the 
aims. For the Triple Aim to realize the change the IHI is proposing, the 
healthcare delivery system must achieve all three aims together in a manner 
that results in better care for all.40 
In defining and describing the Triple Aim, Berwick identified certain 
“preconditions” for pursuit of the Triple Aim, which are required because of 
specific “design constraints” inherent in the U.S. system.41 More specifically, 
Berwick asserts that to accomplish the Triple Aim, the following 
preconditions must be established: (a) create a definition of “population” 
under the Triple Aim that relates to enrollment and ability to track and 
monitor a patient, as opposed to a geographic population;42 (b) create policy 
constraints that will balance each of the aims in order to achieve all, as 
                                                 
37 The Mayo Clinic has an international reputation and sections of its website are 
dedicated to its international medicine practice, which “serves patients who come from outside 
the United States seeking medical care at Mayo Clinic.” Mayo Clinic Staff, International 
Medicine Practice, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/departments-centers/general-
internal-medicine/minnesota/overview/specialty-groups/international-medicine-practice (last 
visited July 28, 2014). Services include consultative care for international patients, coordinate 
of international patient care, preventative screening services for health maintenance, and 
collaborative care of patients with chronic medical illnesses. Id. See also Patients Beyond 
Borders, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.patientsbeyondborders.com/hospital/mayo-clinic (last 
visited July 28, 2014) (“Each year more than 8,000 international patients from 140 countries 
travel to one of Mayo’s locations.”). 
38 See Davis, supra note 10, at 8. 
39 See generally Berwick, supra note 7; see also generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel, 
Why Accountable Care Organizations are Not 1990s Managed Care Redux, 21 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N. 307 (June 6, 2012). 
40 Berwick refers to “universal coverage” as “The Holy Grail” and thus views a 
system in which we have the effects of a single-payor system, but without the obligation of the 
government to provide it, as the ultimate goal of healthcare in the United States. See Berwick, 
supra note 7, at 761. 
41 Id. at 762–63. 
42 Id. Berwick states that for purposes of accomplishing the aims for a 
“population” it is not necessary to think about populations in terms of where they live, but a 
group of people for who certain care goals can be achieved. An example might be a definition 
such as, “all of the diabetics in Massachusetts” or “members of Group Health Cooperative of 
Puget Sound.” Id. Berwick believes that this definition is essential because only when we can 
define a specific population can we start to consider what that population’s experiences are 
relative to healthcare, health status, and the costs related to caring for such a population. Id. 
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opposed to simply one, aim; and (c) identify an “integrator.”43 The authors 
define this “integrator” as a single entity that accepts responsibility for 
implementation of the Triple Aim across its “population” (however such 
“population” has been defined).44 
While all preconditions are critical, Berwick believes that 
identification of an integrator is a key component of pursuit of the Triple 
Aim, as it is critical to have an entity that links healthcare organizations 
together in order to overlap the “spectrum of delivery.”45 One example of an 
integrator could be Kaiser Permanente, but Berwick notes that effective 
integrators are really any entities that can link healthcare organizations 
“whose missions overlap across the spectrum of delivery.”46 As Berwick 
states, “[t]he important function of linking organizations across the 
continuum requires that the integrator be a single organization (not just a 
market dynamic) that can induce coordinative behavior among health service 
suppliers to work as a system for the defined population.”47 Under the ACA, 
this function could be filled by the management of the ACO, but the 
definition is not limited only to ACOs and could be filled by various 
entities.48 
A.  Distinctions Between the Triple Aim and Managed Care 
The general concepts espoused through the Triple Aim perhaps seem 
obvious, self-evident, or even familiar health policy. Indeed, Berwick and his 
colleagues at IHI acknowledge that the general theme is not entirely new 
and, in fact, is already being implemented to some extent in different 
programs across the country.49 Berwick further acknowledges that the goals 
of the Triple Aim are not unlike the goals of the managed care movement of 
the 1980s and 1990s and the emergence of HMOs, as he has stated, “As 
conceived by their greatest champion, Paul Ellwood, HMOs were, or were 
intended to be, integrators exactly as we propose, in pursuit of the Triple 
Aim.”50 
If IHI is correct and managed care and HMOs have been aspiring to 
the same goals as the Triple Aim for years, what then is different about the 
                                                 
43 Id. at 762–63. 




48 Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. § 1395j. 
49 See Berwick, supra note 7, at 766 (noting that the Veterans Health 
Administration, the Indian Health Service, and the Military Health Command are all examples 
of integrated systems within government and that classic HMOs and systems like Kaiser 
Permanente, HealthPartners, and Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (combinations of 
the provision of services and insurance) as examples in the commercial system). 
50 Id. at 766 (citing P.M. Ellwood et al., Health Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED. 
CARE 291 (1971)). 
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Triple Aim and the ACO movement today, and why does IHI believe the 
Triple Aim can accomplish what HMOs could not? Much has been written 
since the emergence of ACOs regarding this exact question; that is, are 
ACOs really all that different from HMOs?51 Berwick’s response is that 
while HMOs appeared to hold the same goals as the Triple Aim, HMOs were 
not, in fact, applying the Triple Aim as he and others conceived it: 
The HMO movement was eventually defined by its organizational 
structure rather than its aims and performance. The experience of people 
enrolled in HMOs was not sufficiently improved to overcome the restriction 
of choice of providers or the perceived barriers to access to specialists that 
became part of the HMO model. Because they restricted care, HMOs were 
vulnerable to competitive retaliation by indemnity insurers and others, which 
began offering products called “HMO” or “managed care” that merely 
managed money, not care.52 
Essentially, argues Berwick, HMOs failed to fulfill that aspect of the 
Triple Aim that improves the patient experience of care, allowing instead 
cost containment to become the sole driver.53 This can be seen by example in 
many of the state laws that were enacted in response to the rise of HMOs in 
the 1990s.54 The Minnesota legislature, for example, amended Chapter 62D 
of the Insurance Title to address concerns regarding the operations and 
practices of health maintenance organizations.55 Minnesota’s § 62D.12 lists 
the “prohibited practices” of managed care companies, which prohibitions 
include, inter alia, denying or limiting coverage of a service that the enrollee 
has already received solely on the basis of lack of prior authorization or 
second opinion if the service would have otherwise been covered absent that 
authorization process.56 While denials and prior authorizations were viewed 
negatively from a consumer protection perspective (and thus many other 
states’ enacted laws that echoed Minnesota’s law), such approaches were 
                                                 
51 See Emanuel, supra note 39, at 2263; see generally Muhlestein, The 
Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13. 
52 Berwick, supra note 7, at 766. 
53 See generally Berwick, supra note 7; see also Anna Wilde Mathews, Can 
Accountable-Care Organizations Improve Health Care While Reducing Costs?, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020472020457712890171457
6054 (noting a comment by Donald Berwick, stating: “[HMOs] required patients to stay 
within their own networks, but, for many patients, the trade-off between loss of choice and 
improved care was worth it. By the 1970s, however, mutant forms of managed care emerged 
that kept the restrictions but not the care improvements. Doctors and patients sensed the game 
and didn’t like it. By the 1980s, HMOs had a bad name.”). 
54 See MINN STAT. §§ 62D.01–62D.24 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-32-101–
56-32-138 (2014) (Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1986); WIS. STAT. § 609.10 
(2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.38-010 (West 2014); IOWA CODE §§ 514b.1–5146.33 
(2014). 
55 See MINN. STAT. §§ 62D.01–62D.24. 
56 MINN. STAT. § 62D.12, subd. 19 (coverage of service); see also TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 56-32-129. 
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nevertheless successful cost containment measures for HMOs.57 Others have 
arrived at similar conclusions as Berwick regarding some of the failings of 
HMOs, finding that the limitations and restrictions that were implemented 
for purposes of cost savings resulted in poor patient satisfaction, which 
ultimately resulted in the consequent rejections of such plans by 
consumers.58 
B.  Development of ACOs under the ACA 
It is with the backdrop of both the benefits and the downfall of the 
managed care movement of the 1980s and 1990s that the Obama 
administration and legislators considered new delivery models under the 
ACA.59 While there were many complaints and frustrations with the financial 
drivers and data points that HMOs used to measure success (as opposed to 
health outcomes), one thing that is difficult to argue with regarding the 
managed care movement is that it saved money.60 Thus, when considering 
how to reform the healthcare system and the spiraling healthcare costs that 
have developed since the managed care movement was curbed through 
consumer protection laws, legislators and policy experts were keenly aware 
that certain aspects of the managed care movement needed to be a part of the 
new system of reform.61 But, they were also keenly aware that simply 
creating a new statutory scheme of HMOs with a new name would also not 
be effective change.62 This is where the Triple Aim and the development of 
accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) came into play: ACOs share many 
of the same goals of the managed care movement, but are intended to bring 
the focus away from solely cost containment.63 That change in focus is 
highlighted by two key differences between ACOs and HMOs: (1) ACOs 
manage care through providers (as opposed to insurers), utilizing outcome-
                                                 
57 Morrell, supra note 20, at 242. 
58 See Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13, at 3 (stating 
“MCOs, though, came to be seen as limiting patient choice and potentially rationing necessary 
healthcare services to increase profits through limited networks of providers, stiff gatekeeping 
requirements and utilization review, resulting in insurer-based ‘death panels’ where 
anonymous underwriters determined who received care”); Morrel, supra note 20, at 242; 
Martin Markovich, The Rise of HMOs, RAND CORP. (2003), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD172/RGSD172.ch1.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2014). 
59 See Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1373. 
60 See Markovich, supra note 58, at 13 (“The effectiveness of HMOs in 
controlling costs has been the subject of a tremendous volume of research and analysis. . . . 
The balance of the evidence indicates that HMOs have reduced overall healthcare costs 
through several mechanisms and substantially contributed to the cost de-escalation of the 
1990s. This de-escalation has caused costs to recede as an issue in the consciousness of the 
public, the press, and elected officials.”). 
61 Id.; see Morrell, supra note 20, at 242–43. 
62 See Morrell, supra note 20, at 243; Muhlestein, The Accountable Care 
Paradigm, supra note 13, at 7. 
63 See Berwick, supra note 7, at 760. 
2015] KEEPING OUR EYES ON THE PRIZE 189 
driven data and quality metrics, as opposed to financial measures, and (2) 
ACOs have access to technological advancements in patient tracking and 
monitoring, enabling a new and improved approach to healthcare delivery.64 
ACOs, as defined under the ACA, are legal entities organized as 
groups of providers of services and suppliers who work together to manage 
and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries through 
accountability for quality, cost, and overall care65 through the MSSP.66 In an 
effort to incentivize this coordination of care, the MSSP program attempts to 
align participating providers/suppliers with one another (particularly 
hospitals and physicians) by agreeing to share with the ACO any savings that 
the Medicare program might realize from healthcare expenditures for the 
same Medicare beneficiaries in previous years.67 
At its heart, the MSSP program is much like a gainsharing 
program.68 Gainsharing arrangements have been the subject of much 
analysis, research, and discussion since the 1990s, which the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) has addressed in several advisory 
opinions.69 As recognized by CMS and the requestors in these advisory 
                                                 
64 See Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13, at 4. 
65 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. 1395jjj. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See Newman, supra note 25, at 9; see also generally Nicole Martingano-
Reinhart, Gainsharing and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 43 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1325, 1348 (2013). 
69 OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-1, 2001 WL 36190940 (Jan. 11, 2001), 
available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2001/ao01-01.pdf; OIG Advisory 
Opinion No. 05-01, 2005 WL 6289864 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005/ao0501.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-02, 2005 WL 
6289865 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005
/ao0502.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-03, 2005 WL 6289866 (Feb. 10, 2005), available 
at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005/ao0503.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion 
No. 05-04, 2005 WL 6289867 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs
/advisoryopinions/2005/ao0504.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-05, 2005 WL 6289868 
(Feb. 18, 2005), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005
/ao0505.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-06, 2005 WL 6289869 (Feb. 18, 2005), available 
at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005/ao0506.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion 
No. 06-22, 2006 WL 6252293 (Nov. 9, 2006), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs
/advisoryopinions/2006/AdvOpn06-22NewA.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-21, 2007 
WL 6400848 (Dec. 28, 2007), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopini
ons/2007/AdvOpn07-21A.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-22, 2007 WL 6400849 
(Dec. 28, 2007), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2007/Adv
Opn07-22A.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 08-09, 2008 WL 6067519 (July 31, 2008), 
available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2008/AdvOpn08-09B.pdf; OIG 
Advisory Opinion No. 08-15, 2008 WL 6067525 (Oct. 06, 2008), available at https://
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2008/AdvOpn08-15.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion 
No. 08-21, (Nov. 25, 2008), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/
2008/AdvOpn08-21.2.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 09-06, 2009 WL 2371264 (June 23, 
2009), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2009/AdvOpn09-06.pdf; 
OIG Advisory Opinion No. 12-22, 2012 WL 7148098 (Dec. 31, 2012), available 
at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2012/AdvOpn12-22.pdf. 
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opinions, gainsharing arrangements were first proposed in order to align the 
actions of a hospital’s medical staff with that of the hospital itself.70 While 
CMS has lauded the perceived benefits of gainsharing, approved certain 
limited gainsharing proposals, and funded several pilot programs,71 it has 
consistently held the opinion that gainsharing programs are not permissible 
under the Anti-kickback Statute72 and the Civil Monetary Penalties Act73 due 
to the concern that gainsharing will ultimately drive providers (physicians 
and hospitals alike) to reduce the amount of care or lower the quality of care 
that is provided to beneficiaries.74 Despite the concerns expressed by CMS in 
various advisory opinions, the concept of shared savings programs and their 
system of using such provider collaborations for purposes of improving the 
healthcare delivery system eventually made an impact on Congress, resulting 
in the development of the ACO model and the MSSP under the ACA.75 
ACOs, as they have come to be known, have their origins with Elliot 
Fisher and the Dartmouth Atlas Project, who first described an ACO as: 
“provider collaborations that integrate groups of physicians, hospitals, and 
other providers around the ability to receive shared-savings bonuses by 
achieving measured quality targets and demonstrating real reductions in 
overall spending growth for a defined population of patients.”76 The ideas 
expressed by Fisher, Dartmouth Atlas Project, and others started to gain 
                                                 
70 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The need for these incentives arises 
out of the differences between the manner in which hospitals are paid versus physicians under 
the Medicare program. Hospitals are paid based on a diagnosis related group (DRG), which is 
a flat fee payment based on a particular condition of the patient. For a detailed description of 
DRGs, see BARRY R. FURROW ET. AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 785–
88 (7th ed., 2013). In contrast to this, physicians participating in the Medicare program are 
paid on a fee-for-service basis for each procedure, exam, or other service performed. Id. This 
distinction in payment structure creates a system in which the hospital would like to 
encourage the physician to provide fewer services, given that the hospital will only receive the 
amount as is appropriate for the patient’s designated diagnosis code, whereas the physician is 
motivated from a revenue generation perspective to order as many tests as can be supported as 
medically necessary. Id. 
71 See note 69 and accompanying text. CMS funded the Medicare Physician 
Group Practice Demonstration, which demonstrated project tested forms of gainsharing. See 
generally JOHN KAUTTER ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE MEDICARE PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE 
DEMONSTRATION, FINAL REPORT (2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Demonstration-Projects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/Downloads/PhysicianGroupPracticeFinal
Report.pdf. 
72 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2014). 
73 Id. § 1320a-7a (2014). 
74 See id. §§ 1320a-7b, 1320a-7a.; see 73 Fed. Reg. 38502, 38550 (July 7, 2008) 
(noting five concerns regarding gainsharing including stinting). 
75 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj. 
76 Aaron McKethan & Mark McClellan, Moving from Volume-Driven Medicine 
Toward Accountable Care, Health Affairs Blog (Aug. 20, 2009); see generally Elliot Fisher et 
al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS (2007), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w44.full. 
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widespread attention77 and eventually made its way to MedPac in 2009. 
MedPac issued a report to Congress, one section of which was titled Why 
Medicare May Want Accountable Care Organizations.78 MedPac’s support 
for ACOs in the report stemmed in large part from its observations that 
Medicare was on an unsustainable trajectory regarding spending and 
proposed ACOs as a new mechanism for potentially curbing the trajectory.79 
The report made specific mention of certain gainsharing models that were 
already being tested under then-current Physician Group Practice (“PGP”) 
demonstration and provided examples for how the concept might be 
expanded to a larger scale.80 As the concept of the ACO and shared savings 
began to move through Congress, the underpinnings of the Triple Aim and 
the ascent of the ACO started to work in concert, resulting in an ACO-
definition that focused not only on cost savings, but promotion of 
accountability for an entire patient population, and also the redesign of care 
processes for high quality and efficient service delivery.81 
III.  CONSIDERING THE MAYO CLINIC AND ACOS UNDER THE 
ACA 
Themes of the Triple Aim are present in the language of the ACA, 
and the focus on integration in the ACO regulations moves many providers 
closer to the idea of achieving the Triple Aim more than ever before.82 In 
fact, Berwick himself sees ACOs as a step in the right direction, stating, 
“Taken together, [the changes to the final regulations for ACOs] create a 
more feasible and attractive on-ramp for a diverse set of providers and 
organizations to participate as ACOs. . . . We believe that today’s ACO rule 
is the next step in our shared commitment to a better, more lasting healthcare 
system.”83 While the revised regulations may be moving some providers 
closer towards achieving the goals of the Triple Aim, those entities lauded as 
models of accountable care and for purposes of developing the ACO 
structure are, for the most part, not participating in an ACO or the MSSP.84 
                                                 
77 See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727, 1760 (2011). 
78 MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE 
PROGRAM, 39 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/Jun09_
EntireReport.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
79 Id. at 43. 
80 Id. at 40. 
81 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj. 
82 See Donald M. Berwick, M.D., Making Good on ACOs’ Promise—The Final 
Rules for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 19 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (2011) 
[hereinafter Berwick, Making Good on ACOs’ Promise]. 
83 Id. at 1755–56. 
84 See Medicare Shared Savings Programs Accountable Care Organizations, 
DATA.CMS.GOV, https://data.cms.gov/ACO/Medicare-Shared-Savings-Program-Accountable-
Care-O/pfam-u3vp (last visited Mar. 28, 2015); see generally Pioneer ACO Model, CMS.GOV, 
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Pioneer-ACO-Model/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
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This disconnect between those healthcare systems intended to be emulated 
for purposes of healthcare delivery because of their ability to achieve the 
Triple Aim, like the Mayo Clinic, and their lack of participation in the ACO 
structure under the ACA calls into question whether the ACO regulations, as 
drafted, are in fact accomplishing the goals they were set out to establish. In 
order to understand this disconnect, it is necessary to examine first whether 
the Mayo Clinic and other similarly integrated systems are not participating 
as ACOs in either the MSSP or the Pioneer ACO Program.85 
A.  Integrated Delivery Systems and ACO Participation 
As President Obama toured the United States in 2009 promoting the 
ACA, he frequently referred to Geisinger Health System, Intermountain 
Health System, Mayo Clinic, and other integrated delivery models as 
systems that he believed already served as models of how healthcare should 
be provided to all U.S. citizens.86 It is certainly true that many of these 
integrated delivery systems seem to have figured out how to provide quality 
care, without excess spending on a per capita basis under the Medicare 
program.87 In an article that was considered required reading for the Obama 
                                                 
85 The ACA established the MSSP in connection with formation of an ACO 
under § 3022 of the ACA. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj. In 
2012, the CMS Innovation Center, established under Section 1115A of the ACA, launched a 
second program known as the Pioneer ACO Program, working in concert with the MSSP, 
which was intended for those entities who had previously participated in Physicians Group 
Practice demonstration projects. See Accountable Care Organization Model: General Fact 
Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 12, 2012) available at http://
innovation.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Pioneer-ACO-General-Fact-Sheet.pdf. There were 
initially 32 entities that were selected to participate in the Pioneer ACO Program. Id. Unlike 
the Pioneer ACO Program, which requires that participants be at-risk for the shared savings 
and losses from the beginning of the program, the MSSP offers a sort of “phase in” for two-
sided risk in which the ACO can either be responsible for both a share of the losses and the 
savings, in exchange for a higher share of the savings, or only take part in the savings. 76 Fed. 
Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425). Under the final rule, no ACO 
participating in the MSSP can stay on a one-sided risk model forever, as all ACOs must 
transition to two-sided risk by the end of three years. Id. Note that proposed rules were 
published on December 8, 2014, which rules contemplate permitting ACOs to remain in a 
one-sided risk-model for an additional period of time. 79 Fed. Reg. 72760, 72869 (Dec. 8, 
2014) (amending 42 C.F.R. § 425.600(b)). 
86 On the President’s Radar Screen, GEISINGER ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, http://www.
geisinger.edu/med-ed/clin_camp/pages/president.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2015); Bernie 
Monegain, Intermountain, Geisinger get Spotlight in Obama Speech, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS 
(July 1, 2009), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/intermountain-geisinger-get-spotlight-
obama-speech; John Daly, Obama Singles Out Intermountain Healthcare as a Model System, 
KSL NEWS 5 (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.ksl.com/?sid=7873613 (last visited Oct. 16, 2014); 
OBAMA REMARKS, supra note 15. 
87 See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN HEALTH CARE SPENDING: A 
CLOSER LOOK (2009) [hereinafter AHA], available at file:///C:/Users/Jon/Downloads
/twnov09geovariation.pdf. 
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administration during the period leading up to enactment of the ACA,88 Atul 
Gawande explored the cost of healthcare spending relative to its outcomes in 
The Cost Conundrum in THE NEW YORKER.89 Gawande highlighted the 
Mayo Clinic for its high quality and cost containment successes, stating: 
Americans like to believe that, with most things, more is 
better. But research suggests that where medicine is 
concerned it may actually be worse. For example, Rochester, 
Minnesota, where the Mayo Clinic dominates the scene, has 
fantastically high levels of technological capability and 
quality, but its Medicare spending is in the lowest fifteen 
percent of the country - $6,688 per enrollee in 2006, which 
is eight thousand dollars less than the figure for McAllen[, 
Texas].90 
Much of Gawande’s findings were based on a study published by 
The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy & Clinic Practice, which study 
explored care provided to patients with severe chronic illness.91 In one 
chapter of the Dartmouth Institute’s study, the authors examine America’s 
“best hospitals” regarding their management of chronic illness, and find that 
despite possessing superior clinical scientific knowledge, academic medical 
centers vary greatly in how they manage chronic illnesses.92 After an 
examination of the various practices of academic medical centers in general, 
the authors established the Mayo Clinic as a model academic medical center 
due to its “strong national reputation for quality, while simultaneously [being 
able to keep] utilization and costs relatively low.”93 The authors further 
suggested using the Mayo Clinic as a benchmark for “a strategy to reduce 
overuse of the acute care sector in managing chronic illness.”94 In 
                                                 
88 Robert Pear, Health Care Spending Disparities Stir a Fight, N.Y. TIMES (June 
8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/us/politics/09health.html?ref=todayspaper&_r
=1& (“President Obama recently summoned aides to the Oval Office to discuss a magazine 
article investigating why the border town of McAllen, Tex., was the country’s most expensive 
place for healthcare. The article became required reading in the White house, with Mr. Obama 
even citing it at a meeting last week with two dozen Democratic senators.”). 
89 See Gawande, supra note 24. 
90 Id. The author examined the city of McAllen, Texas, which according to 
statistics in 2009 had the highest spending per Medicare enrollee of any city in the country. 
91 JOHN E. WENNBERG ET AL., THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY AND 
CLINICAL PRACTICE, TRACKING THE CARE OF PATIENTS WITH SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS: THE 
DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE 2008 (2008), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.
org/downloads/atlases/2008_Chronic_Care_Atlas.pdf. 
92 Id. at 39 (noting that “academic medical centers vary widely on all three 
measures – resources, utilization, and spending-a finding that raises a serious challenge to the 
assumption that clinical science plays a dominant role in determining the patterns of medical 
practice at these prestigious hospitals”). 
93 Id. at 40. 
94 Id. But see Peter J. Nelson, The Mayo Clinic: High Quality Yes, but Low Cost?, 
CENTER OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.americanexperiment
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considering this information and its delivery of care in light of the goals of 
the Triple Aim, the Mayo Clinic appears to embody all prongs of the Triple 
Aim: namely, quality care for the patient, quality care for populations, and 
cost-effective care.95 The question remains, then: if the Mayo Clinic is 
achieving the Triple Aim, why is it, or other systems like it, not forming an 
ACO or participating in the MSSP, which is supposed to be the embodiment 
of the Triple Aim? 
Ironically, the Mayo Clinic’s lack of participation is not unique; 
indeed, many of the systems that were promoted as models for development 
of an ACO structure have not formed ACOs and are not participating in the 
MSSP.96 The reasons that wide-spread adoption of the ACO structure by 
integrated delivery systems such as the Mayo Clinic are varied. One of the 
primary reasons is existing challenges for many of these organizations to 
make a profit, or break-even, on Medicare patients, thus making achievement 
of any shared savings a near impossibility.97 As Gawande noted, data 
indicates that Mayo Clinic spending on its Medicare patients is lower on 
average than other institutions; however, such successes do not necessarily 
indicate that the Mayo Clinic is realizing increased revenues or “profits” 
from these patients.98 
In considering Gawande’s observations of the Mayo Clinic, author 
Peter Nelson noted that while the Mayo Clinic has demonstrated success on 
                                                                                                                   
.org/publications/policy-in-detail/the-mayo-clinic-high-quality-yes-but-low-cost (finding that 
“when it comes to understanding value-the intersection between cost and quality-the 
Dartmouth research is limited by the fact that it covers only Medicare patients. In Medicare, 
the government sets prices and, as a result, the prices in the Dartmouth data reflect national 
Medicare policies and do not reflect the price of healthcare services negotiated between 
private health plans and providers more generally. . . . Evidence shows that the Mayo Clinic is 
actually a high cost provider when compared to other Minnesota providers.”). 
95 See Berwick, supra note 7, at 760. 
96 As of the middle of 2014, while there were 366 ACOs registered in the MSSP, 
less than 15 of these ACOs were large academic medical centers. See Medicare Shared 
Savings Program, CMS.GOV, https://data.cms.gov/ACO/Medicare-Shared-Savings-Program-
Accountable-Care-O/ay8x-m5k6 (last visited June 27, 2014). Neither Mayo Clinic, Kaiser 
Permanente, nor Intermountain have registered as ACOs under the MSSP or under the Pioneer 
ACO program. 
97 It was reported that the Mayo Clinic lost $840 million on Medicare patients in 
2009 and due to similar circumstances in their Arizona facilities have begun to require a 
$2,000 retainer fee with a $250 administrative fee for Medicare patients, as all Mayo Clinic 
facilities are non-participating in the Medicare program because they do not accept Medicare 
Part B. See also Medicare and the Mayo, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748703436504574640711655886136. See Tony Brayer, Why the 
Mayo Clinic is Refusing to See Medicare Patients, KEVINMD (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.
kevinmd.com/blog/2010/01/mayo-clinic-refusing-medicare-patients.html. 
98 See Gawande, supra note 24; see also Total Medicare Reimbursements per 
Enrollee, by Adjustment Type (Year: 2010), THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/topic/topic.aspx?cat=21 (last visited, Mar. 28, 2015) 
(noting that Minnesota has an average Medicare spending rate of between $6,911 and $8,100 
with Rochester, Minnesota with a spending rate of $7,229, which is among the lowest in the 
United States). 
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its Medicare spending for Medicare beneficiaries, such lower spending may 
be offset by what appears to be higher than average reimbursement on 
services from third party commercial payors.99 In fact, research from 
Dartmouth Medical School supports a finding that Medicare patients at the 
Mayo Clinic consistently pay far less than, and have superior outcomes 
relative to, other systems across the country.100 Such research also finds, 
however, that spending for Medicare patients is different relative to the 
average of overall spending for all patients in the state of Minnesota.101 
Nelson believes that such distinctions exist because the study is limited to 
only a study of Medicare patients and does not reflect the price that private 
individuals pay through commercial insurance.102 Thus, Nelson argues, while 
it appears that Mayo Clinic’s Medicare costs per beneficiary demonstrate 
greater efficiency, the Mayo Clinic currently offsets such shortfalls by being 
one of the highest priced providers in the Minnesota market when it comes to 
commercial insurance.103 
Nelson’s observations regarding the high cost of care at the Mayo 
Clinic for patients with private insurance is not only evidenced in historic 
data regarding the difference in average spending on Medicare beneficiaries 
and overall spending,104 but has also been evidenced through the insurance 
market and, most recently, the health insurance exchanges in Minnesota.105 
Although Minnesota as a state spends at or below average for Medicare 
patients,106 average commercial insurance premiums for family coverage are 
above average, with Minnesota as one of the highest ten states in the 
nation.107 More precisely, Minnesotans who live in the southeastern part of 
the state who attempted to purchase insurance on Minnesota’s health 
insurance exchange, MNSure, experienced higher premiums on average than 
in other parts of the state and fewer options for providers than in other areas 
                                                 
99 See Nelson, supra note 94. 
100 Id. 
101 See AHA, supra note 87, at 14. 
102 Id. at 10, 13. 
103 Id. 
104 See generally id. 
105 See Associated Press, Mayo’s Dominance Skews Health Insurance Exchange in 
SE Minnesota, PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Mayo’s Dominance], 
http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_24405205/mayos-dominance-skews-health-
insurance-exchange-southeastern-minnesota. 
106 See AHA, supra note 87, at 4 (noting that Minnesota has below average 
unadjusted spending per beneficiary and an average spending per beneficiary when adjusted 
for wages, health status, graduate medical education, indirect medical education, and 
disproportionate share hospital payments). 
107 See id.; Cathy Schoen et al., Paying the Price: How Health Insurance 
Premiums Are Eating Up Middle Class Incomes, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 8 (2009), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/data-
brief/2009/aug/1313_schoen_paying_the_price_db_v3_resorted_tables.pdf (noting that 
Minnesota families’ average commercial insurance premiums for family coverage is in excess 
of $13,001 per family, which is higher than the national average of $12,298). 
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of the state.108 Experts believe that the reason for this skewed effect in this 
region is due to the presence of the Mayo Clinic in southeast Minnesota and 
the higher costs that insurers have to pay for services at the facility.109 
The effect of this high-cost is likely evident in the fact that the Mayo 
Clinic is currently only available as an in-network provider in one plan 
available on the health insurance exchange in Minnesota, although there are 
other insurers in the state who are in talks with the Mayo Clinic to include 
them in other networks in the future.110 Note, however, that the Mayo Clinic 
is not alone in this phenomenon.111 Of the top 18 institutions nationally 
ranked by U.S. News and World Report, six institutions accept only one 
insurance plan on the exchange (including, without limitation, Cleveland 
Clinic and UCSF Medical Center) and five accept only two insurance plans 
on the exchange (including, without limitation, UCLA Medical Center and 
Northwestern Memorial Hospital).112 
For some insurers, regardless of the cost, there is no option but to 
contract with certain academic medical centers for services, as some AMCs, 
especially those that provide specialty pediatric care, are considered 
“essential community providers” under the ACA and thus are required to be 
                                                 
108 Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105 (noting that Sandra Toogood checked her 
options in October of 2013 and found only one plan that included the Mayo Clinic, the main 
provider in her area, and as a 55 year old with no available subsidies her monthly premium 
was $594 for a mid-level plan, which compared to $268 per month in St. Paul/Minneapolis, 
Minnesota). 
109 Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105. 
110 Patrick Howley, Hospital Cited by Obama as Health-Reform Model for the 
Nation Accepts only One Kind of Insurance Plan under Obamacare, DAILY CALLER (Feb. 23, 
2014), http://dailycaller.com/2014/02/23/hospital-cited-by-obama-as-health-reform-model-
for-the-nation-accepts-only-one-kind-of-insurance-plan-under-obamacare/ (noting that the 
only insurance exchange offering that is accepted at the Mayo Clinic is the Blue Cross Blue 
Shield silver plans); see also Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105 (stating that “Officials with 
Medica, another major Minnesota provider, said they’re working with regulators to offer 
individual and small group plans in Rochester on the exchange as early as next year. The 
company currently offers plans in the rest of Olmstead County, but not in the two Rochester 
ZIP codes.”). 
111 See Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105 (finding that the insurance premiums 
being higher are not uncommon in other parts of the country where there is a single, dominant 
provider). 
112 See Tori Richards, Top Hospitals Opt Out of Obamacare, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/hospital-of-tomorrow/articles
/2013/10/30/top-hospitals-opt-out-of-obamacare; see also Which Hospitals Take Your Health 
Insurance Under Obamacare?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://
health.usnews.com/health-news/hospital-of-tomorrow/articles/2013/10/30/which-top-hospi
tals-take-your-health-insurance-under-obamacare. Regarding the remainder, three accept only 
three insurance plans on the exchange (including, without limitation, New York-Presbyterian 
University Hospital of Columbia and Cornell and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center) 
and three of the four remaining hospitals accept all insurance offerings on the exchange, 
pursuant to requirements under state law, including top-ranked Johns Hopkins. Note that the 
data is based on the 2013–2014 rankings for U.S. News and World Report, but since the date 
of the article U.S. News and World Report has released the 2014–2015 rankings. See Best 
Hopsitals 2014–15, supra note 23. 
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included in all health insurance options.113 For those insurers who have 
options, however, they are more reticent, or at least very concerned, 
regarding the inclusion of high-cost providers in their networks.114 Prior to 
the ACA, paying certain providers, such as AMCs, higher rates for services 
was less of a cause for concern for insurers because insurers could simply 
raise premiums on their insureds based on certain rating factors.115 For 
example, if an insurance company received an application from an individual 
in his or her 50s who smokes, has a previous history of heart disease, and a 
family history of cancer, the insurance company could either refuse to insure 
the individual or require the individual to pay an extremely high premium, 
based on the fact that the insurer is likely to end up spending more on this 
individual than others due to pre-existing conditions and family history. 
Under the ACA, insurance companies are prevented from denying 
individuals insurance coverage based on pre-existing conditions and limited 
in their ability to rate individuals based on anything other than age and 
tobacco use.116 Additionally, for those insurers who are participating in the 
exchanges, the insurers have no idea what sort of a population “mix” they 
will receive in their new exchange plans.117 It is possible that an insurer 
offering insurance on the exchange might end up insuring a population of 
individuals who are all older and sicker than average individuals. Ensuring 
                                                 
113 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021 (2014), 
18031(c)(1)(C) (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 156.235 (defining “essential community providers” as 
“providers that serve predominantly low-income, medically underserved individuals, 
including providers that [are eligible to receive § 340B(a)(4) funding under the Public Health 
Services Act or are defined under Section 1927(c)(1)(D)(i)(iv) of the ACA].”). But see Steve 
Davis, Narrow Network Lawsuit Takes Odd Turn; Premera Seeks to Dismiss Judge’s 
Decisions, HEALTH BUS. DAILY (July 7, 2014), http://aishealth.com/archive/nblu0714-01 
(noting that Seattle Children’s Hospital filed a lawsuit against the insurance commissioner in 
connection with its exclusion from certain exchange plan offerings on the Washington state 
exchange, Healthplanfinder) and Joe Carlson, Exchange Exclusion Suit, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 12, 2013), available at http: 
114 Due to restrictions under the ACA regarding the ability of insurers to deny 
coverage for or rate certain individuals, insurers have less ability to manage risk through 
selection of beneficiaries and therefore are looking towards other means to ensure cost 
savings. See M.P. McQueen, Less Choice, Lower Premiums, Many Exchange Plans Will Offer 
Narrow Networks, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.
com/article/20130817/MAGAZINE/308179921. 
115 See David Orentilcher, The Future of the Affordable Care Act: Protecting 
Economic Health More Than Physical Health, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2014) (“Before 
the ACA’s reform of the individual market, high premiums caused by preexisting conditions 
created a substantial obstacle to job mobility.”). 
116 42 U.S.C. § 300gg. 
117 See Sara R. Collins et al., Covering Young Adults Under the Affordable Care 
Act: The Importance of Outreach and Medicaid Expansion, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1 (2013), 
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2013/
aug/1701_collins_covering_young_adults_tracking_brief_final_v4.pdf (“Young adults’ 
participation in the nation’s new insurance marketplaces is essential: as a healthier-than-
average population, it allows for comprehensive plans to be offered at affordable prices to all 
enrollees over time.”). 
198 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:177 
enrollment of young and healthy individuals on the exchanges was a key 
focus for insurers, as healthy under-utilizers of services whose premiums are 
in excess of claims are necessary to offset higher spending on older, sicker 
individuals whose claims far exceed premium payments.118 Thus, given these 
new market dynamics, insurers are suddenly less willing to contract with 
historically higher-cost providers like AMCs.119 
If the ACA and the MSSP are focused on Medicare beneficiaries, 
and entities like the Mayo Clinic are performing well relative to spending on 
Medicare beneficiaries, do premiums on the commercial side matter at all? 
Indeed, the fact that the Mayo Clinic and other top-ranked institutions may 
be reimbursed at a higher rate by commercial insurers does not indicate that 
the individuals receiving care at those institutions are not provided with the 
highest level of care.120 This is also not to say that the quality of services 
provided to Medicare patients differs from those that are provided to 
commercial pay patients or that the Mayo Clinic, based on its financial 
incentives, does not actually provide more efficient care than other systems. 
If the Mayo Clinic is equally efficient in the provision of its care to 
its patients, why then are the costs from commercial insurance so much 
higher? Kathleen Harrington, government relations chair of the Mayo Clinic, 
states a similar argument to most other AMCs across the nation, which is that 
the Mayo Clinic treats patients with very complex illnesses and supports the 
cost of research and education, the costs of which are not borne by all 
hospitals.121 Ms. Harrington states, “We’re not a community-based hospital. 
This is an academic medical center that does research, education, and top-of-
the-pyramid care for the sickest of the sick. The cost is naturally higher.”122 
These comments are not unique to the Mayo Clinic, as other AMCs and 
research institutions experience similar issues: “The supervision and teaching 
of trainees, whether in the hospital or in an outpatient clinic, take time, and 
time costs money. Reducing the cost of training will require fundamental 
changes in the way [that the mission of an AMC] is pursued.”123 Thus, while 
it may be true that Mayo Clinic provides efficient and effective care for all of 
its patients, certain aspects of what makes the Mayo Clinic a leader in its 
field is due in part to the research, innovation, and training that are only 
possible, to some extent, due to high reimbursement Mayo Clinic receives 
from commercial insurers. In considering this reality in the context of ACOs 
and the Triple Aim, it is evident that achieving the balance and equity that 
Berwick contemplated in providing quality care that is available and 
                                                 
118 Id. at 1–2. 
119 See Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105. 
120 See Best Hospitals 2014–15, supra note 23. 
121 See Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105. 
122 Id.  
123 Kastor, supra note 28. 
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accessible to all is challenging, even at our most efficient and renowned 
quality institutions.124 
Despite the intentions of legislators and regulators at CMS, the Mayo 
Clinic and other providers that many thought would lead the country through 
healthcare reform are opting instead for care delivery alternatives.125 In 
addition to the challenges regarding Medicare payments cited above, a few 
other themes have emerged from these healthcare leaders regarding their 
respective decisions not to participate in either the MSSP or the Pioneer 
ACO programs.126 Two of the primary issues for these providers relate to 
reimbursement under Medicare and the manner in which the ACOs were 
structured under the regulations.127 For example, in an interview given in 
2011, George Halvorson, chair and CEO of Kaiser Permanente’s hospitals 
and health plans, commented that part of the reason that they did not have 
any plans to participate in the MSSP was due, in large part, to reimbursement 
and also the complexity of the regulations: 
Private care delivery can [provide integrated care now]. The 
problem is they’re not paid for it. At [Kaiser Permanente] we 
do six things for seniors that help keep bones from breaking, 
and three of the six do not appear on a Blue Cross or 
Medicare or Medicaid fee schedule….For Medicare, it 
means that even though (the program isn’t) going to pay for 
what the pharmacist and nurse do, if as a result of this you 
save money on broken bones providers get half the savings. 
Right now the caregivers who do that work get absolutely no 
                                                 
124 See Nelson, supra note 94, at 4 (stating “The evidence that Mayo is a high-cost 
provider in Minnesota suggests that high-quality medical care does come at a higher price 
when providers are free to negotiate, just like high-quality services in any other industry. 
Consequently, in a Medicare system that pays Mayo for the true value that it provides, the 
average patient will likely cost more than $53,432.”). 
125 Chris Anderson, CMS Taps 32 Health Systems for Pioneer ACO Program, 
HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/cms-
taps-32-health-systems-pioneer-aco-program?single-page=true (“Those systems, the Mayo 
Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic, Geisinger Health System and Intermountain Healthcare, are often 
touted among the ‘poster boys’ for care quality and cost controls many want to see in a 
revamped national healthcare system.”). 
126 See Jenny Gold, ‘Poster Boys’ Take a Pass On Pioneer ACO Program, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Sep. 14, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/september
/14/aco-pioneers-medicare-hospitals.aspx. One entity that stands in contrast to some of the 
other large integrated delivery systems is Geisinger Health, which is participating in the 
Keystone ACO. See generally KEYSTONE ACO, available at http://www.keystoneaco.org/ 
(last visited July 1, 2014) (listing Geisinger Medical Center, Geisinger-Wyoming Valley 
Medical Center, Geisinger-Community Medical Center, and Geisinger-Bloomsburg Hospital 
as participating hospitals in the ACO). 
127 Joanne Silberner, Head of Major HMO Sees Openings for Accountable Care 
Organizations–the KHN Interview, Kaiser Health News (July 25, 2011), http://www.kaiser
healthnews.org/stories/2011/july/25/halvorson-q-and-a-kaiser-permanente-accountable-care-
organizations.aspx. 
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reward and actually lose revenue. But the version of ACOs 
that was written into the law for Medicare is complex and 
the law wasn’t as well drafted as it could have been.128 
Halvorson’s comments regarding complexity have been echoed by 
others. In a study released by Medical Group Management Association 
(“MGMA”) in 2011, it communicated to CMS that, by MGMA’s estimate, 
up to 90% of its members would likely not be participating in the MSSP due 
to the complexity of the regulations and the expectations regarding the 
reporting requirements.129 CMS attempted to address some of these concerns 
with changes to the final ACO regulations130 and with the creation of the 
Pioneer ACO Program; which was a coordinated effort to offer greater 
incentives and greater simplification to encourage industry leaders such as 
the Mayo Clinic to participate. The Pioneer ACO Program did attract some 
AMCs and other integrated institutions, such as Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health 
Pioneer ACO and Partners Healthcare, but the initial participation of AMCs 
remained relatively low. 131 While Halvorson was somewhat critical of the 
ACO regulations, he was more positive and encouraged by the possibilities 
of other aspects of the ACA stating, “Medicare is creating some pilot 
programs with ACOs, and I think there are going to be a few dozen of these 
that are going to figure out ways of dealing with the patient population more 
directly.”132 
Intermountain cited similar frustrations with the ACO regulations, 
but more so with aspects of the regulations that imposed little obligations on 
                                                 
128 See Silberner, supra note 128. Note that from the date of this interview, the 
ACO regulations were revised somewhat, but as of the date of this article, Kaiser Permanente 
is still not participating in any type of ACO program. Melanie Evans, Providers See Little 
Enthusiasm to Join Pioneer ACOs, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Evans, 
Providers See Little Enthusiasm to Join Pioneer ACOs], http://www.modernhealthcare.
com/article/20140901/NEWS/309019991/providers-see-little-enthusiasm-to-join-pioneer-
acos. See Silberner, supra note 127.  
129 See Anderson, supra note 125. 
130 For example, one of the primary complaints is related to the reporting of 
quality metrics. The initial regulations required the reporting of 65 different measures. 76 Fed. 
Reg. 19528 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). The final regulations 
were amended to require the reporting of only 33 metrics. 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 425); see Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 84. 
131 Partners Healthcare is a non-profit healthcare system that is a teaching affiliate 
of Harvard Medical School and provides physician services at Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital, Massachusetts General Hospital, and other hospitals in and around the Boston area. 
See About Partners HealthCare, PARTNERS HEALTHCARE, http://www.partners.org/
About/Default.aspx?id=1 (last visited June 30, 2014); Jessica Zigmond, CMS Names ACOs 
Leaving Pioneer Program, MODERN HEALTHCARE (July 16, 2013), http://www.
modernhealthcare.com/article/20130716/NEWS/307169945/cms-names-acos-leaving-pioneer-
program. 
132 Joanne Silberner, Head of Major HMO Sees Openings for Accountable Care 
Organizations—The KHN Interview, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 25, 2011), http://kaiser
healthnews.org/news/halvorson-q-and-a-kaiser-permanente-accountable-care-organizations/. 
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the part of Medicare beneficiaries, “Since Medicare’s accountable care 
program does not require patients to actively select an ACO—or even, once 
enrolled, seek care from that ACO—Intermountain is instead developing 
what officials call a shared accountability organization.”133 In the formation 
of its own accountable care focused organization, Intermountain seems to be 
retaining the goals of the Triple Aim, as Intermountain states that the 
approach of the shared accountability organization is to provide better care, 
better health, and better care management.134 
As the data from Leavitt Partners has demonstrated, Intermountain 
Health is not alone in its attempts to accomplish some reforms in the system 
outside the structure of the ACO.135 Due to dissatisfaction with the 
regulations, a lack of confidence or success in the MSSP program, or for 
various other reasons, many providers are opting to form their own ACO-like 
organizations intended to accomplish similar goals.136 In fact, of the 626 
entities Leavitt Partners identified as practicing accountable care, 210 of 
those entities were not participating in any sort of government program.137 
The Mayo Clinic is one such organization that is trying alternative system 
reform models. The Mayo Clinic has formed the Mayo Clinic Care Network, 
which it describes as: 
[A] network of like-minded organizations which share a 
common commitment to improving the delivery of health 
care in their communities through high-quality, data-driven, 
evidence-based medical care. The network recognizes that 
people prefer to get their health care close to home. The 
main goal of the network is to help people gain the benefits 
of Mayo Clinic expertise without having to travel to a Mayo 
Clinic facility.138 
The “network” essentially supplies providers otherwise unaffiliated 
with the Mayo Clinic with access to physicians from the Mayo Clinic for 
consultations, protocols, and other tools and expertise (primarily electronic) 
                                                 
133 Evans, Beyond ACOs, supra note 28. Some key features of Intermountain’s 
accountability organization involved placing up to 25% of doctors’ compensation at risk for 
performance on quality and cost targets and incorporating the use of shared decision-making 
and benefit design that would hold patients accountable for their care. Id. 
134 See Shared Accountability, INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, http://intermountain
healthcare.org/about/overview/trustees/for-trustees/healthcare-initiatives/shared-accountability
/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
135 See Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13, at 6. 
136 Id. 
137 See Matthew Petersen et al., Growth and Dispersion of Accountable Care 
Organizations: August 2013 Update, CTR. FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE INTELLIGENCE (2014), 
available at http://www.cap.org/apps/docs/advocacy/aco/aco_growth_dispersion.pdf. 
138 See Mayo Clinic Care Network, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org
/about-mayo-clinic/care-network (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
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and periodic monitoring from a Mayo Clinic physician.139 Providers 
participating in this program can utilize the Mayo Clinic Care Network name 
for purposes of marketing in exchange for a fee that paid to the Mayo Clinic 
for the services and use of the name.140 While the network hospitals do not 
have any joint ownership or joint contracting at this point, features and 
programs in the network, especially the use of electronic systems and shared 
data, may enable the network, in the future, to financially integrate in a more 
formal manner that could provide care for patients in a similar manner across 
the country.141 Despite the goal of the ACA to organize large numbers of 
providers into similar organizations, what has evolved is a system in which 
providers, suppliers, and insurers are continuing to explore various 
healthcare delivery systems (with some common themes to ACOs) on a 
contract by contract basis for certain discrete services.142 Similarly, AMCs 
and integrated delivery systems like the Mayo Clinic are opting out of ACOs 
entirely, and instead are charting their own paths towards the provision of 
accountable care outside the MSSP context.143 
IV.  CURRENT STATUS OF ACOS UNDER THE ACA? 
If ACOs were intended to serve as the mechanism by which the U.S. 
healthcare system could realize, or at least move closer towards, the Triple 
Aim, and those institutions that were thought to be role models in that 
movement are not participating as ACOs, what does that mean for purposes 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 One of the biggest challenges under the current healthcare system with forming 
a multistate system that would be truly integrated from a financial perspective relates to the 
system of reimbursement. Due to various insurance regulations and the structure of health 
insurance reimbursement, negotiating payor contracts that could apply to various entities that 
are located in various states across the country could be challenging. For example, the Blue 
Cross Blue Shield systems have a sort of national umbrella organization, but there are 37 
insurance companies that are incorporated in various states and negotiate contracts with 
providers in those specific states. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, www.bcbs.com (last visited Oct. 
21, 2014). 
142 See David Muhlestein et al., Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, 
LEAVITT PARTNERS (Dec. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO 
Covered Lives], http://leavittpartners.com/2013/12/geographic-distribution-of-aco-covered-
lives/. 
143 In addition to larger academic medical centers and large integrated delivery 
systems, many rural hospitals found themselves opting out of participation in ACOs. Justin 
Kearns, Rural Roads to ACOs: Inter-Community Collaboration is Key to Rural Accountable 
Care Organizations’ Success Under Medicare Shared Savings Program, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 
425 (2013). In response to the preliminary regulations for ACOs, CMS made many 
adjustments that were intended to assist rural providers in being able to meet necessary 
hurdles for purposes of participating in the MSSP. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.404. For example, 
federally qualified health centers (“FQHCs”) and rural health clinics (“RHCs”) were permitted 
to form independent ACOs. Id. Additionally, there are exceptions for rurally-based ACOs in 
connection with the antitrust safety zones that would excuse rural ACOs from the 30% market 
share limits. Id. 
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of the success of ACOs fulfilling their goals and purposes? Are ACOs, as 
structured under the ACA, able to provide that success for all kinds and type 
of providers across the country, including leaders in healthcare like the Mayo 
Clinic? Do AMCs and other integrated delivery systems need to participate 
in the MSSP and/or Pioneer ACO Program to realize the Triple Aim? 
A.  ACO Successes 
In order to answer the above questions, it first seems necessary to 
consider how current ACOs are faring and analyze their successes and 
challenges. The phrase “accountable care organization” first made its 
appearance into healthcare vernacular in 2007, and has since exploded into 
the industry due to the use of these ACOs under the MSSP.144 Industry 
experts have defined the generic concept of an ACO as an entity that consists 
of “providers who are jointly held accountable for achieving measured 
quality improvements and reductions in the rate of spending growth.”145 As 
noted above, there are likely far more organizations that are practicing 
accountable care or functioning as accountable care organizations, but the 
term ACO and entities utilizing the ACO moniker are most predominantly 
entities participating in the MSSP.146 Initial indications from ACOs under the 
MSSP are that many entities participating in the program have been 
                                                 
144 See generally Fisher, supra note 76. 
145 Mark McClellan et al., A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care Into 
Practice, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 982 (2010), available at http://content.healthaffairs.
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146 See Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13, at 4. 
Muhlestein and his colleagues conducted a study of accountable care organizations in an effort 
to compare such organizations to HMOs to understand the distinctions and similarities 
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authors did not limit their study group to those entities that are participating in the MSSP. 
Rather, Muhlestein noted: 
In any effort to define accountable care, a distinction must be drawn 
between the accountable care movement and Medicare Shared Savings 
Program (MSSP). An MSSP ACO is a payment model established by 
statute and regulation with a defined structure and specific objectives. The 
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focus on MSSP ACOs, many definitions are limited to explanations of the 
MSSP, but this is insufficient to define the movement as a whole given the 
intense activity occurring by non-Medicare players, including private and 
state-level Medicaid efforts. 
Id. at 6 (internal citations omitted). As mentioned above, the intention of this Article is to 
focus on the specific provisions of the ACA to determine whether the existing structure as 
drafted in the ACA will enable the industry to function in fulfillment of the goals of the Triple 
Aim. Therefore, ACOs are examined through the lens and definition set forth under the ACA, 
although the authors acknowledge that there are many organizations that are practicing 
accountable care in different manners. 
204 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:177 
successful in cost savings and quality improvements.147 In examining 
preliminary data from the Medicare ACOs and the Pioneer ACOs, HHS 
reported that savings from both programs in 2014 generated over $372 
million in total savings for the Medicare program, and generated shared 
savings payments of $445 million.148 HHS reported that ACOs in their 
second performance year improved on quality scores and patient experience 
measures.149 This comes on the heels of reports that were released in the 
middle of 2014, stating that in the MSSP program over the first 12 months 
“…nearly half (54 out of 114) of the ACOs that started the program 
operations in 2012 already had lower expenditures than projected. Of the 54 
ACOs that exceed their benchmarks in the first 12 months, 29 generated 
savings totaling more than $126 million ….”150 The Pioneer ACO program 
has also demonstrated high quality scores, with a mean quality score of 
85.2% and an estimated total savings of over $96 million with shared savings 
payments of $68 million.151 
Although there have been some successes, there have also been some 
growing pains. In the two years since the program’s beginning, nine of the 
Pioneer ACOs dropped out of the program in the first year152 and an 
additional four dropped out of the Program in the second year, leaving the 
grand total of participants at 19.153 Granted, the ACO numbers from the 
MSSP (and to some extent the Pioneer ACOs) are still preliminary and the 
program is in its infancy, there are at least preliminary indications that 
entities participating in the program are achieving savings and are 
performing well on quality metrics.154 
                                                 
147 Medicare’s Delivery System Reform Initiatives Achieve Significant Savings and 
Quality Improvements—Off to a Strong Start, HHS.GOV (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.
hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/01/20140130a.html. 
148 See Facts Sheets: Medicare ACOs Continue to Succeed in Improving Care, 




150 See Medicare’s Delivery Reform Initiatives, supra note 147. 
151 See CMS, Facts Sheets, supra note 148. 
152 Molly Gamble and Heather Punke, 100 Accountable Care Organizations to 
Know, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com
/lists/100-accountable-care-organizations-to-know.html. It should be noted that seven of the 
nine that dropped out Pioneer ACO Program transitioned into the MSSP. Id. 
153 Melanie Evans, Medicare’s Pioneer Program Down to 19 ACOs after Three 
More Exit, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Evans, Medicare’s Pioneer 
Program Down to 19 ACOs], http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140925/
NEWS/309259938&utm_source=AltURL&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=am&Allow
View=VXQ0UnpwZTVBL2FiL1IzSkUvSHRlRU9nalVrZEErVlY=?mh. 
154 Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 425 subd. F. Note that under the MSSP, achieving 
quality goals is built into the payment structure such that an entity that is not performing well 
on quality metrics will not achieve a maximum level of savings. Prior to the payment of any 
savings under the program, CMS assesses a score for the ACO on the established 33 quality 
metrics. The percentage of “success” on quality metrics is applied to the savings. For example, 
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In fact, there are three systems in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
Minnesota area that are participating in the MSSP and one of the systems, 
Allina Health, performed the best overall on diabetes measures according to 
data released by CMS regarding five of the 33 measures upon which CMS 
reported in the beginning of 2014.155 Reporting of the metrics, however, has 
been one of the biggest challenges for the program.156 Although the reporting 
of public data from CMS has been somewhat limited, those reporting the 
data have stated that the process of reporting the data to CMS has 
“accelerated improvement efforts and strengthened care, most notably in 
areas not previously tracked by providers and in areas of weak 
performance.”157 Although Allina Health stated on its website that it did not 
earn any shared savings for the first quarter,158 others have found that, at 
least according to the results that have been reported publicly by CMS, there 
appears to be a correlation between strong quality performance and cost 
savings.159 While the reporting requirements, and the lack of publicly 
available information, have been criticized, it does seem that the 
requirements to begin the process of tracking and reporting these quality 
metrics has made systems and hospitals more aware of where their attention 
needs to be focused in terms of quality.160 
While ACOs are on the rise and appear to be making an impact on 
the market, at least as related to savings, the percentage of ACO covered 
lives remains low relative to total population.161 As of December 23, 2013, 
                                                                                                                   
if the entity scores 100% on the quality metrics, the ACO may be paid the entirety of the 
savings that are owed to the ACO based on the formula set forth in the ACO. If the entity 
instead scores only 40% on the quality metrics, the entity could only be paid 40% of the 
available savings that are owed to the ACO based on the same formula. 
155 See Jordan Rau, Medicare Data Show Wide Differences in ACOs’ Patient 
Care, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org
/Stories/2014/February/21/Medicare-Data-Shows-Wide-Differences-In-ACOs-Patient-
Care.aspx. Kaiser Health News reported that 88% of Allina Health’s diabetes patients kept 
their blood pressure under the target set by Medicare of 140/90 mmHg. Note, however, that it 
appears that there were some challenges in gathering and reporting of data. John Muir Health 
Medicare ACO in San Francisco scored poorly, as the report stating that only 9% of its 
patients had their blood pressure below the rate set by Medicare. John Muir, however, stated a 
reporting error in which 534 of the 616 patients did not have blood pressure readings due to a 
computing error. John Muir Health Medicare ACO claims that of the 73 patients whose blood 
pressure was reported, 71% met the Medicare rate. Id. 
156 Melanie Evans, Limited Medicare ACO Quality Data Show Sharp Variation in 
Performance, MODERN HEALTHCARE (May 3, 2014) [hereinafter Evans, Limited Medicare 
ACO Quality Data], http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140503/MAGAZINE/3050
39990 (noting that “CMS has released results for only five of 22 quality measures it has 
responsibility for publishing.”). 
157 Id. 
158 See Medicare Accountable Care Organization (ACO), ALLINA HEALTH, 
http://www.allinahealth.org/ahs/medicalservices.nsf/page/aco (last visited June 30, 2014). 
159 See Evans, Limited Medicare ACO Quality Data, supra note 156. 
160 See id. 
161 See Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 
142, at 3–4. 
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CMS reported that there were a total of 366 ACOs participating in either the 
MSSP or the Pioneer ACO program.162 Leavitt Partners published a study 
last updated in June, 2014 in which it examined 626 entities that it 
considered to be ACOs,163 consisting of 329 entities that had government 
contracts (and are thus participating in either the MSSP or the Pioneer ACO 
program), 210 entities had commercial contracts, and 74 entities that had 
both kinds of contracts.164 Due to the establishment of ACOs in the ACA, 
Leavitt Partners reported that at least some ACO activity is seen to some 
degree in all 50 states.165 While activity is increasing, and is seen nationwide, 
the percentage of ACO covered lives remains relatively low, with a 
penetration of between just three and 10% of total covered lives in most 
states.166 There are two states that have reported greater than 15% of their 
covered lives in the state are participating in ACOs, with Oregon reporting 
the highest rate at 25%.167 The study concluded that, based on current trends 
and penetration, the best chance for success of ACOs is in markets (a) that 
already have a strong history of managed care (such as the Geisinger Health 
System in Pennsylvania, the Kaiser Permanente system in California, and the 
                                                 
162 More Partnerships Between Doctors and Hospitals Strengthen Coordinated 
Care for Medicare Beneficiaries, CMS.GOV (Dec. 23, 2013) [hereinafter CMS Press Release, 
More Partnerships], http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/
2013-Press-releases-items/2013-12-23.html; David Muhlestein, Accountable Care Growth In 
2014: A Look Ahead, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Jan. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Muhlestein, 
Accountable Care Growth], http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/01/29/accountable-care-growth-
in-2014-a-look-ahead/. 
163 Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 142, at 
1–2 (clarifying that the study tracked entities that are practicing “accountable care” and not 
just those entities that are considered ACOs under the MSSP program). 
164 Petersen, supra note 137, at 1. The study noted that they are tracking 13 other 
ACOs, but such entities have not yet released specific information regarding the activities, 
even though they have reported their intentions to “practice accountable care.”); see also 
Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 142 at 1–2. Since the 
date of the published study, CMS published its report regarding the fourth round of MSSP 
participants and the third round of Pioneer ACO organizations. Accountable Care 
Organization 2014 Program Analysis Quality Performance Standards Narrative Measure 
Specifications, CMS.GOV (Aug. 15, 2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/ACO-
NarrativeMeasures-Specs.pdf. 
165 Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 142, at 
3. (noting that Alabama does not have an ACO that is headquartered in its state, but there are 
residents of the state of Alabama who are participating in ACOs that are headquartered in 
other states). Id. at 4; Petersen, supra note 137, at 4. 
166 Peterson, supra note 137, at 5. 
167 Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 142 at 
4–5 (arguing that Oregon’s success is due in large part to the fact that Oregon’s Medicaid 
Program implemented a system in August of 2012 in which it utilizes Coordinated Care 
Organizations (“CCOs”) for delivering care to its Medicaid population). Id. at 4. This program 
was implemented with funding from CMS, which provided Oregon with $1.9 billion to 
implement the program, which is expected to reduce per capita healthcare spending in its 
Medicaid population by two percentage points by 2014. Id. Similar programs are also active in 
Colorado and Utah and are being planned in Alabama, Illinois, and Iowa. Id. 
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Intermountain Health system in Utah), (b) where there are dominant payors 
and/or providers that have already been practicing accountable care (e.g., 
commercial insurers who are already operating pay for performance 
programs or gainsharing programs), or (c) where state legislation has 
amended its Medicaid program to operate through ACOs or ACO-like 
organizations.168 
B.  ACO Challenges 
While there has been some demonstration of success for ACOs, 
some challenges remain. In considering whether the ACO structure enables 
providers to function more like entities such as the Mayo Clinic, it must be 
acknowledged that the Mayo Clinic and others function quite differently 
from most healthcare delivery systems across the nation, and the ACO 
structure has not accounted for all of those distinctions.169 As Gawande 
points out in The Cost Conundrum, the relationship between the physicians 
and the other healthcare professionals vis-à-vis the Mayo Clinic is quite 
distinct from the relationship between physicians, professionals, and the 
hospitals in McAllen, Texas: 
The core tenet of the Mayo Clinic is “The needs of the 
patient come first”—not the convenience of the doctors, not 
their revenues. The doctors and nurses, and even the janitors, 
sat in meetings almost weekly, working on ideas to make the 
service and the care better, not to get more money out of 
patients. I asked [the Chief Executive Officer of the Mayo 
Clinic] how the Mayo Clinic made this possible. “It’s not 
easy,” he said. But decades ago Mayo recognized that the 
first thing it needed to do was eliminate the financial 
barriers. It pooled all the money the doctors and the hospital 
system received and began paying everyone a salary, so that 
the doctors’ goal in patient care couldn’t be increasing their 
                                                 
168 Id. at 4. 
169 Kaiser Permanente is the largest nonprofit health plan in the United States and 
is known for its integrated approach to care in that it closely coordinates primary, secondary, 
and hospital care. See What Health Systems Can Learn from Kaiser Permanente: An Interview 
with Hal Wolf, MCKINSEY & CO. (July 2009), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights
/health_systems_and_services/what_health_systems_can_learn_from_kaiser_permanente_an_
interview_with_hal_wolf. Kaiser Permanente is the largest nonprofit health plan in the United 
States and is known for its integrated approach to care in that it closely coordinates primary, 
secondary, and hospital care. All those patients who receive care at Kaiser Permanente are 
enrollees of their health plan. This is unlike other systems that accept multiple types of 
insurance products. Similarly, Intermountain Healthcare also has an associated health plan and 
a connected medical group. See INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, http://intermountain
healthcare.org/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“Intermountain Healthcare in an 
internationally recognized, nonprofit system of 22 hospitals, a Medical Group with more than 
185 physician clinics, and an affiliated health insurance company, SelectHealth.”). 
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income. Mayo promoted leaders who focused first on what 
was best for patients, and then on how to make this 
financially possible.170 
While ACOs have incorporated the concept of gainsharing through 
the MSSP, which is intended to eliminate some of the financial barriers the 
Mayo Clinic CEO was referencing, gainsharing does not generate the same 
effect as hospitals employing or contracting with physicians and then paying 
the physicians a salary or flat-fee, thus eliminating the incentive for over-
utilization.171 Implementing structural change such as the structure of the 
Mayo Clinic, however, is far easier said than done. 172 
The majority of all hospitals in the country have no financial 
relationship with physicians on their medical staffs, and little money to 
undertake such structural changes that would alter that fact.173 In fact, 
according to a recent survey from the American Medical Association 
(“AMA”), 60% of physicians work in private practices owned by physicians 
(either as owners or employees of the practice), with only 23% working in 
practices owned in whole or in part by a hospital or hospital system, and only 
slightly over 5% of physicians are employed directly by a hospital or hospital 
system.174 The AMA has itself acknowledged that the current manner in 
which physicians interact and are engaged with hospitals may prove an issue: 
“While some physicians will easily be able to adapt to and engage in 
Accountable Care Organizations or other health delivery structures that 
emphasize greater integration and care coordination, for others it will prove 
more of a challenge.”175 
Given the structure of most hospital systems, implementing even a 
gainsharing structure (much less an employed or contracted physician 
structure) that endeavors to create this alignment presents substantial 
                                                 
170 See Gawande, supra note 24, at 12. 
171 While the number of employed physicians is increasing, a report from the 
American Medical Association found that only about 212,000 physicians are employed by 
hospitals, which includes a small number of dentists and medical residents. Carol K. Kane & 
David W. Emmons, New Data on Physician Practice Arrangements: Private Practice 
Remains Strong Despite Shifts Toward Hospital Employment, AM. MED. ASS’N. 2 (2013), 
available at http://www.nmms.org/sites/default/files/images/2013_9_23_ama_survey_prp-phy
sician-practice-arrangements.pdf. As of 2012, about 60% of physicians worked in a private 
practice as either employees or owners. The fact remains that the many physicians in the 
country have medical staff privileges to perform services at hospitals, but all or the majority of 
the revenue that they receive for such services is generated from billing payors (including 
Medicare and Medicaid) on a fee-for-service basis. 
172 See id. at 6. 
173 See generally id. 
174 Id. Of those individuals who are directly employed by hospitals or hospital 
systems, data indicates an increase in primary care physicians, which is done with the 
intention of maintaining a strong referral base to the hospital’s specialty physicians. Id. at 8. 
The two more often reported employed physicians were internal medicine and family practice 
physicians. Id. 
175 Kane & Emmons, supra note 171, at 8. 
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challenges to hospitals.176 IHI has emphasized that improving patient 
experience, managing population health, and lowering the per capita cost of 
healthcare (achieving the Triple Aim) in many instances may mean 
providing less costly care or simply less care.177 For many hospitals, 
however, the provision of less costly care or less care in the current 
environment is likely to have a large impact on the bottom line that may not 
be offset by potential savings to a specified Medicare population.178 Thus, 
trying to convince providers to shift the paradigm towards an ACO model 
seeking to achieve the Triple Aim is actually a greater task than it would first 
appear. 
An example of this challenge can be seen in the following scenario: 
assume that a patient goes to see an orthopaedic physician due to a wrist 
injury. Upon examination, the wrist appears to be broken in two places. The 
physician notes that the nature of the break is such that it would likely have a 
very successful outcome if the patient has surgery and a metal rod inserted. 
Surgery will require admission to the hospital, as the surgery must be done 
on an inpatient basis. Alternatively, the break is relatively clean and it is 
possible that it will heal nicely on its own with a splint and cast, and proper 
monitoring and follow-up. In the current fee-for-service driven system, both 
the hospital and the physician will generate the highest revenue if the 
physician recommends that the patient have surgery.179 From the patient 
perspective, surgery is likely to drive up fees in the form of co-pays, co-
insurance, and deductibles, and will likely mean time off work or school. 
Attempting to splint and cast the arm first, however, will be more cost 
efficient and less invasive for the patient. From a Triple Aim perspective, the 
surgical option, unless absolutely warranted from a medical perspective, 
potentially fails two “aims” in that it is more costly for the payor and the 
patient, and does not provide quality services that are consistent with patient 
satisfaction.180 That said, the non-surgical option provides the least amount 
                                                 
176 Id. at 4. See also Susan Kreimer, ACOs: Multi-Year Transition Requires an 
Overhaul to Healthcare Delivery, MED. ECON. (June 24, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.
modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/acos-multi-year-transition-requires-overhaul-
healthcare-delivery?page=full; see also Gawande, supra note 24, at 15. 
177 See Berwick, supra note 7, at 720. 
178 See Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2. 
179 Both the hospital and the physician will be paid if the physician chooses to 
perform surgery (the hospital in the form of the technical fee and the physician in the form of 
the professional fee). To the extent that the physician opts for the “wait and see” approach, the 
hospital will not bill for any services and the physician will only bill for the associated office 
visit. 
180 It should be acknowledge that patient satisfaction is often times a subjective 
standard. While the splint and cast option will be less costly to the patient and will not involve 
a hospital stay, it is possible that a patient would choose the surgical option in order to ensure 
that the break is fixed right the first time and it avoids having to sit around and see if the non-
surgical option works. To the extent that the patient ends up having to have surgery regardless, 
it is arguable that the patient could claim more satisfaction if the surgical option had been 
chosen from the beginning. 
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of revenue for the physician and the hospital. If the physician and hospital 
are participating in an ACO under the MSSP, choosing the non-surgical 
option will be less costly, and may lead to the ability to share in overall 
savings, assuming quality metrics are met.181 In making this decision, 
however, both the hospital and physician are forced to consider whether the 
potential savings that may be achieved will be offset by services provided to 
other patients. 
Mayo Clinic and other integrated delivery systems have noted the 
challenges that are presented by a new reality that providing more efficient 
care might mean providing less care in connection with their hesitancy in 
participating in the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program, which reality has been 
echoed by hospitals that are currently participating in ACOs.182 As the 
example above demonstrates, the paradigm shift away from fee-for-service 
reimbursement towards efficient and more cost-effective care also moves the 
focus away from a hospital’s average daily census, which has been the 
historical bellwether for hospitals in ensuring sufficient revenues.183 
Margaret O’Kane, President of the National Committee for Quality 
Assurance explained: 
Learning to function “180 degrees differently” will require a 
lot of innovation in a leaner environment. . . . “The business 
incentive for a hospital usually is to have heads in beds, and 
if you’re an ACO, you’re trying to keep people out of the 
hospital and healthy[.] It could take down the whole 
organization if your hospital beds are empty, so it’s a 
complicated transition for a hospital.”184 
One provider that seems to have guarded against this is MissionPoint 
Health Partners in Nashville, Tennessee, for which the ACO is currently only 
available for employees of Saint Thomas Health, and for which health 
insurance is self-funded.185 St. Thomas Health was successful in decreasing 
overall costs from 2012 to 2013, some of which was attributed to savings 
through a reduction in admissions to the hospital and emergency room 
                                                 
181 See Kreimer, supra note 176, at 1. 
182 Gold, supra note 126; see Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2 (noting that hospital-
based ACOs are experiencing more challenges and difficulties than provider-based ACOs). 
183 Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2. An “average daily census” is defined as the “The 
average number of inpatients present each day for a given time period. This figure is derived 
by dividing the sum of patient days for a period by the number of days in the same period.” 
Education Module for Health Record Practice, available at http://www.unc.
edu/~murrell/Health_Care_Statistics_class/Health_Care_Statistics.html (last visited Mar. 28, 
2015). 
184 Id. Kreimer, supra note 176. 
185 See generally MISSION POINT, http://www.missionpointhealth.org/about/ (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
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visits.186 Such reductions in a fee-for-service system necessarily means less 
revenue for the hospital related to such services. In the case of St. Thomas 
Health, however, reduction of those volumes was offset by cost savings 
realized through its employees’ healthcare expenses.187 While successful for 
St. Thomas Health and MissionPoint Health Partners, not all hospitals can 
experience these same savings on the employee side to offset losses in 
revenue on the hospital-side. 
C.  Does the Current ACO Structure Fulfill the Triple Aim? 
It appears, then, that there is conflicting information about whether 
or not ACOs can be successful as a means for fulfilling the Triple Aim. 
Based on preliminary data, ACOs that seem to function well, or are at least 
able to generate some savings and meet quality standards in the MSSP, are 
located in urban settings and consist of large multi-specialty groups of 
providers that do not have a heavy focus on research or teaching, and were 
not previously operating in an integrated system.188 Perhaps some of the 
successes are due to the fact that these organizations likely could have 
practiced better care coordination and realized efficiencies years earlier, but 
were not willing to attempt such changes without financial incentives.189 
Perhaps this is because larger systems involved in research and teaching have 
been sustaining their operations through margins realized on reimbursement 
from commercial payors, but such systems are not (yet) able to achieve any 
savings on Medicare patients, despite providing efficient and effective 
care.190 
Regardless of the reason behind it, the fact that success under the 
MSSP, a key part of the United States healthcare industry, especially for 
AMCs and other integrated delivery systems, remains elusive indicates that 
the ACO scheme currently established under regulations does not appear to 
be achieving the Triple Aim. Evidence supports a finding that the current 
ACO structure may improve patient experience of care, the health of certain 
Medicare beneficiaries, and may reduce the per capita cost of healthcare for 
the Medicare program and certain of its beneficiaries. Such a structure does 
not, however, enable successes at the country’s top AMCs. Absent such 
                                                 
186 Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2–3. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 2. 
189 One of the reasons provided by ACOs that dropped out of the Pioneer ACO 
Program for departure from the program was that fact that the systems were already operating 
at maximum efficiencies, and thus, achievement of additional savings were likely elusive 
because of an inability to reduce additional expenses. Debra Ness &William Kramer, The 
First-Year Pioneer ACO Results: Predictable Bumps in the Road, HEALTH AFFAIRS (July 25, 
2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/07/25/the-first-year-pioneer-aco-results-predictable-
bumps-in-the-road/. 
190 See supra notes 139–144 and accompanying text (discussing the Mayo Clinic 
and its Mayo Clinic Care Network). 
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inclusion, the ACO structure is unable to achieve the equity balance that is so 
critical to the Triple Aim.191 
If the U.S. is to realize the goals of the ACA through adoption of the 
Triple Aim, legislators and regulators must adapt the current ACO 
regulations in a way that will encourage participation of AMCs in ACOs and 
associated care delivery models. A system in which AMCs are unable or 
unwilling to participate in ACOs is likely to result in one of two 
eventualities: (1) AMCs will be squeezed out of any new service delivery 
models, such as ACOs, potentially reducing or eliminating institutions that 
are leading the country in innovation, teaching, efficiency, and quality; or (2) 
ACOs and other evolving healthcare delivery models will falter because 
industry leaders, such as the Mayo Clinic, are not participating in the reform 
movement, which will result in maintenance of the status quo of healthcare 
in the United States. A U.S. healthcare system without providers such as the 
Mayo Clinic would lack in innovation, cutting-edge research, and 
meaningful advancement of evidenced-based research.192 These losses would 
fail to attain the goals of the Triple Aim of achieving better patient care and 
better population health in furtherance of the Triple Aim193 How does the 
healthcare industry avoid this eventuality without putting the country in a 
situation where, either, providers simply opt out of providing services to 
government beneficiaries entirely or AMCs cease to exist as they are known 
today, along with some of the care they provide? 
D.  Recommendations 
Marc Bard was correct to say that it really is not enough for purposes 
of actually reforming the healthcare delivery system in the United States if, 
at the end of the day, the only result is that the entities that were performing 
                                                 
191 See generally Berwick, supra note 7, at 760. 
192 Regulations that also encourage support of rural providers is also essential in 
the system, as assuring access to care in local communities that provides convenience and 
accessibility for patients in rural settings is equally essential for ensuring that healthcare that is 
available to all segments of the population. For purposes of this article, the focus will be on 
the importance of AMCs in the system, but rural providers are also a critical provider that has 
thus far struggled with participating in ACOs. Beth Kutscher, Nine Rural Providers Test Out 
ACO Initiative, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Jan. 28, 2014) http://www.modernhealth
care.com/article/20140128/NEWS/301289912#; see DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM AND RURAL PROVIDERS (2014), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/
Downloads/ACO_Rural_Factsheet_ICN907408.pdf; see also A. CLINTON MACKINNEY ET. AL., 
RUPRI CTR. FOR RURAL HEALTH POLICY ANALYSIS, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN 
RURAL AMERICA (2013) available at http://cph.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/
2013/Accountable%20Care%20Organizations%20in%20Rural%20America.pdf; A. Clinton 
MacKinney et. al., The March to Accountable Care Organizations—How Will Rural Fare?, J. 
RURAL HEALTH 131 (2011). 
193 Id. 
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at maximum efficiency continue to perform at maximum efficiency. 194 
Further, if the U.S. healthcare delivery system is to achieve the Triple Aim, 
which this article argues is a desired and perhaps necessary goal in order to 
truly reform the way in which healthcare is delivered in the U.S., it is not 
enough that a few large urban providers afford greater integrative care for a 
percentage of the U.S.’s Medicare beneficiaries.195 Underlying all of the 
insurance reform, coverage mandates, and quality metrics in the ACA is the 
concept that what the ACA is attempting to accomplish is better care for 
patients, better health for our communities, and lower costs through 
improvement for our healthcare system.196 While the current ACO structure 
is a step in the right direction towards trying to accomplish all of those goals, 
it seems to be falling short of such goals in its current state. Although some 
ACOs may be providing “better care,”197 such care is limited to those 
individuals who happen to live in areas in which ACOs are participating, 
which in large part seem to be centered in urban areas, many with providers 
that were already operating integrated systems.198 Without more widespread 
adoption of the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program,199 current ACOs will 
continue to provide care to a limited portion of Medicare beneficiaries.200 
Additionally, certain providers, such as the Mayo Clinic and Intermountain 
Health System, may be unavailable for individuals who cannot afford their 
services, depending on their insurance coverage.201 Finally, from a cost 
containment perspective, while preliminary data indicates that many 
providers participating in the ACO program have been able to achieve 
savings in the first few years of the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program, as the 
case may be,202 such savings appear limited to only a small portion of urban, 
multispecialty groups that needed financial incentives to realize efficiencies 
that perhaps could have been achieved years earlier.203 Thus, in considering 
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aspects of the Triple Aim: (a) achieving better health for our communities 
remains elusive to the extent that the same quality and level of care varies 
based on where one lives or where one seeks care; and (b) providing better 
population health at a lower cost per patient also proves challenging because 
for those entities, like the Mayo Clinic, that do not or cannot generate 
revenues based on Medicare reimbursement, even if costs can be lowered for 
some Medicare beneficiaries, costs cannot be lowered for all patients.204 
These challenges should not be taken to suggest that the ACO 
concept or structure needs to be scrapped entirely. It seems clear that, despite 
certain reservations with the ACO regulations, the MSSP, and Pioneer ACO 
Programs, providers in the United States are largely in agreement that the 
United States does need to reform the healthcare delivery system in a way 
that provides for more integrated and more coordinated care.205 Given 
growing support for the concept of accountable care, despite somewhat 
slowly evolving participation in the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program,206 it 
seems that the best hope for achieving the Triple Aim and working towards 
those goals envisioned with enactment of the ACA, is to work towards 
revising the ACO structure in such a way that all providers, especially 
AMCs, but also rural hospitals as well as those systems that are already 
finding some successes in the current programs, can participate.207 This 
article proposes three primary changes to the ACO structure that, ideally, 
will adequately encourage participation by a wider percentage of providers, 
including leaders in quality and effective care like the Mayo Clinic. 
First, the ACO structure needs to include comprehensive payment 
reform that eliminates, or greatly reduces, reliance on a fee-for-service 
structure. Granted, there are ongoing pilot projects testing various payment 
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systems,208 but the MSSP and Pioneer ACO program that promotes 
gainsharing while retaining a fee-for-service payment system will be unable 
to evolve to a point where other providers are encouraged to enter.209 If such 
a lack of participation continues for too long, the ACO structure will wither 
and die before any payment reforms can be implemented. In examining why 
systems like the Mayo Clinic have been successful with providing more 
efficient care, observers (and even the Mayo Clinic itself) credit this success, 
in part, to the compensation structure of the Mayo Clinic’s physicians.210 
Unlike private practice physicians who are compensated only when they 
perform services, the physicians at Mayo Clinic have no pressure or need to 
ensure a certain volume of patients or number of procedures in order to 
sustain a practice or make a living.211 
While gainsharing programs such as the MSSP provide some 
physician-hospital alignment, such programs are not sustainable on a long 
term basis as the sole means assuring integration and coordination.212 This is 
true for three primary reasons: (a) at some point, the physicians and hospital 
will be operating at maximum efficiency and further savings and incentives 
will be impossible without the potential for impacting patient care;213 (b) 
shared savings programs like the MSSP alone do not address or control the 
actions of the physicians outside of the hospital setting, which may be used 
to offset losses in fee-for-service revenues at the hospital;214 and (c) if 
hospitals are realizing success in meeting quality metrics and lowering costs 
through gainsharing, such success likely means fewer patients who are 
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seeking services at the hospital,215 which means less revenue based on the 
current payment system.216 To the extent that the Medicare system continues 
to lack comprehensive payment reform, such as bundled payments or value-
based purchasing, which should be implemented in conjunction with shared 
savings incentives, it will be challenging to reform the current system in a 
way that actually emulates the quality and efficiency that is demonstrated by 
providers like the Mayo Clinic. 
Granted, there are ongoing pilot programs for many payment reform 
mechanisms217 and it is important to take the time to ensure that whatever 
payment system is implemented in the future will be successful in 
accomplishing desired goals. It is critical to keep these payment reform 
initiatives a top priority, however, because achieving the goals of the Triple 
Aim and experiencing true cost containment for all populations is unlikely to 
occur so long as the fee-for-service system is still in place.218 So long as the 
fee-for-service system remains, many providers, including a disproportionate 
number of AMCs and other integrated delivery systems, will be either unable 
or unwilling to participate in the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program on the 
basis that achieving savings under these programs, based on their costs in 
providing services, is exceedingly challenging.219 Without wider adoption of 
the MSSP and Pioneer ACO Programs by AMCs and similar research 
institutions, the balance that Berwick avers is so critical for pursuit of the 
Triple Aim is unachievable, because the healthcare system will remain 
fractured as providers pursue their own paths towards healthcare reform 
without coordination and cooperation.220 A system in which various 
providers are pursuing their own goals and aims is not unlike the system that 
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was in effect in the United States prior to adoption of the ACA. That is, the 
Mayo Clinic, Kaiser Permanente, Intermountain Health and other similar 
systems have been pursuing alternative delivery systems and coordination of 
care for years, but without comprehensive payment reform that has forced 
other providers to consider modeling these systems, the systems have 
remained silos in their respective areas with little impact on changing the 
way that other systems function.221 
The second recommendation for amendments to the ACO structure 
is to consider carefully the establishment of the metrics and tracking of 
outcomes data in connection with ACOs and the manner in which such 
quality markers are utilized for purposes of reimbursement.222 In examining 
the Mayo Clinic, even with its successes regarding patient outcomes and 
efficient care delivery (as demonstrated by lower than average Medicare 
spending), it has also been clear that supporting the quality of care that is 
provided at the Mayo Clinic cannot be sustained by the Mayo Clinic or other 
providers based on the current Medicare payment structure.223 As leadership 
at the Mayo Clinic has recognized, as well as other leaders of AMCs, the 
quality care received at the Mayo Clinic is attainable because the Mayo 
Clinic and other AMCs are innovators in their respective fields and conduct a 
large amount of research that ensures that some of the sickest patients are 
receiving care supported by evidenced-based medicine.224 The research and 
innovation that takes place at AMCs across the country is not inexpensive 
and cannot be fully sustained based on Medicare’s current reimbursement 
system, or even such reimbursement system in combination with shared 
savings.225 It is not in furtherance of the Triple Aim, however, to continue a 
system in which such research and innovation is only sustainable to the 
extent that commercial insurers continue to pay more than government 
payors to a group of select providers.226 
In addition to the challenges of funding related to research and 
innovation, the current ACO structure does not recognize distinctions in 
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patient population for purposes of its shared savings.227 AMCs, as specialty 
institutions, tend to have more complex patients with multiple co-
morbidities.228 As a result, keeping these patients out of the hospital and 
complying with some of the 33 quality metrics may be more challenging 
given that the patients are not being treated for only one condition.229 The 
incentives and payment structure of the current ACO system provides for 
exceedingly limited exceptions or allowances for these factors that are 
unique to AMCs.230 Therefore, as providers consider establishing an ACO 
and those other entities with which they would want to associate, AMCs are 
not necessarily an attractive partner, as it is possible that such association 
will actually hinder the ability to achieve shared savings and desired quality 
scores.231 Such issues are especially inherent at an AMC because of the high 
expense structure at AMCs due to the teaching and training aspects of these 
institutions,232 which cannot simply be reduced to the same extent that a 
hospital could save costs related to better coordination of supply chain 
management, for example.233 
In order to address this issue, the ACO structure needs to be adapted 
to account for or allow for some of the inherent challenges of working with 
AMCs. Some of these adjustments can be remedied through payment reform 
that eliminates the fee-for-service payment and provides for compensation 
that is paid across a continuum, encouraging transfer for specialty services as 
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soon as possible, or in the alternative, transfer from a specialty hospital to a 
lower level of care.234 Current fee-for-service structure, despite the 
possibility of shared savings, retains challenges for hospitals in maintaining 
revenues based on lower volumes. Elimination of fee-for-service will shift 
the focus away from the issues related to ensuring a sufficient volume.235 
Additionally, and in the interim, the quality metrics need to be weighted or 
adjusted based on the condition of the patient similar to other systems. While 
classifying how “sick” a patient is can be challenging, the quality metrics 
need to be fluid and flexible enough to have at least some allowances for co-
morbidities or patients who are at a higher complexity, and thus cannot be 
compared from an outcomes perspective with healthier patients. Allowing 
this flexibility will provide a greater likelihood of the possibility of shared 
savings in the current system, despite some variance in outcomes data. 
Maintaining a structure that promotes inclusion of AMCs in ACOs might 
enable the costs of teaching and research to be better spread across a 
multitude of providers, ultimately enabling systems to work together to 
reduce costs as a whole. This coordination should result in a structure that 
more closely resembles the Triple Aim, as it means better care for patients 
and a population across a continuum in settings that should be the most cost 
effective based on patient needs. Such coordination will not take place, 
however, unless AMCs are seen as assets and contributors to the ACO 
structure, as opposed to hindrances. 
Finally, although perhaps the most challenging politically, ACOs 
need to more fully incorporate the concepts promoted by Intermountain 
Health System and others;236 namely, Medicare beneficiaries and commercial 
beneficiaries alike need to be participants in their care in a way that makes 
both providers and patients accountable for a patient’s care.237 One of the 
reasons that HMOs were successful from a cost containment perspective in 
the 1970s and 1980s related to the fact that beneficiaries were limited in their 
movement among providers.238 Cost containment proved successful to the 
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extent that insurers could require patients to seek care from specific 
providers with whom the insurer had already negotiated low rates.239 While a 
lack of flexibility in this area ultimately became one of the key downfalls of 
HMOs long-term, completely ignoring the fact that some level of patient 
involvement and accountability is necessary for cost containment and 
coordination of care disregards some of the lessons that should have been 
learned from the managed care movement. Indeed, one of the biggest 
criticisms of the current ACO structure is that it is challenging for providers 
to control costs if beneficiaries are permitted to seek care from other 
providers outside an established network as well as within the network.240 
From the perspective of the Triple Aim, Berwick himself has 
promoted the flexibility of Medicare beneficiaries to seek care from any 
provider as an aspect of ACOs that is in furtherance of the Triple Aim 
because it enhances the care experience.241 Berwick has stated in recent 
interviews: 
[A]bout 1 in 4 Medicare beneficiaries chooses to be in a 
private health plan through Medicare Advantage, also 
known as Part C Medicare. They accept the restrictions on 
choice of provider in return for better-coordinated care. . . . 
Seventy-five percent of Medicare beneficiaries don’t want 
restricted choices. Do they have to forgo the benefits of good 
managed care? Many experts would say, “Yes.” They think 
that care management is incompatible with patient choice. 
The ACO premise is different. Beneficiaries don’t join an 
ACO; providers of care do. . . . It will work because it is set 
up to reward the right combination of goals for our time: 
transparency, coordination, consumer power and intolerance 
of waste.242 
In contrast, Jeff Goldsmith stated in response, “The biggest problem 
with the ACO, however, isn’t the faulty business proposition, but the 
patient’s role. . . . Patients need to be active agents in their own health, and in 
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an effective care system. They need to choose to participate and be rewarded 
for healthy behavior.”243 
Granted, Berwick’s caution in this area is well-placed in that creating 
an ACO system that ignores some of the key components of HMOs that 
ultimately gave rise to the failure of such HMOs would simply be repeating 
history. That said, does the current system that enables patients to receive 
care from any provider, even though the providers themselves are restricted 
in terms of their patients, truly achieve the Triple Aim? Can you still achieve 
the aim of patient experience if ultimately the patient ends up receiving (and 
paying for) the same test three times due to a lack of coordination among the 
patient’s various providers, for example? Recall the dilemma discussed 
earlier involving the patient who has a broken wrist.244 Suppose that the 
physician does in fact recommend splinting and casting the arm to see if it 
heals on its own, in lieu of surgery. Suppose also, however, that the patient is 
busy and does not want to have to be in a splint and then cast for the next 
eight weeks because the patient is planning on taking a trip to the beach in 
five weeks. Under the current MSSP and Pioneer ACO Program, the patient 
is permitted to seek care from another provider, who may decide to perform 
the surgery. If the plurality of the care is still provided by the original 
physician who recommended the splint and case, the physician’s ACO will 
still be assessed the cost of the surgery and related expenses for purpose of 
its shared savings calculation, even though such costs were not incurred at 
the recommendation of the original physician.245 Thus, physicians within an 
ACO have greater difficulty in providing the kind of efficient and 
accountable care for which such physicians will be judged, on the basis that 
the ACO physicians cannot prevent the beneficiary from seeking care outside 
the ACO.246 To the extent that the patient is prohibited from going to the 
other physician without first discussing it with his first physician, might that 
force (even if initially uncomfortable) a conversation between the patient and 
physician where the patient talks about the trip to the beach and what the 
alternatives might be? It could be argued that the latter scenario will provide 
the patient with ultimately increased patient experience because the patient 
will feel involved and a part of the care process and decision, and ultimately 
(ideally) feel fulfilled about the medical decision that the patient and 
physician arrived at collectively. 
It seems that it is necessary to arrive at some sort of middle ground 
with respect to the role of the patient within the ACO structure that more 
meaningfully incorporates the involvement and accountability of the patient, 
without restricting care in a way that does not fulfill the Triple Aim.247 
Interestingly, there has already been evidence of the resurgence of the 
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narrow network as insurance products have rolled out onto the various 
exchanges across the country.248 Insurers, unsure about the potential costs of 
newly insured individuals whom the insurance companies are now unable to 
rate in advance,249 want to create networks that can be tightly held and 
controlled with incentives for the providers to provide cost effective and 
efficient care as well as disincentives for the patients to seek care outside the 
narrow network.250 While these narrow networks have not been viewed 
positively by all consumers,251 there are many consumers on the exchanges 
who are electing narrow network options because of the lower premiums 
associated with these plans.252 As Berwick himself has pointed out, many 
consumers abandoned managed care when restrictions that restricted quality 
care were hoisted upon them with little choice in the matter and little 
flexibility.253 To the extent that Medicare beneficiaries are offered both 
choice and incentives, similar to the choice that they can make today to 
participate in traditional Medicare or Medicare Advantage, would they be 
willing to participate in an ACO structure in which they committed to a 
particular set of providers for at least some period of time? Perhaps the 
problem with HMOs was not so much the restrictions, but a lack of ability to 
choose whether to agree to such restrictions at a lesser cost or based on 
certain incentives. 
While it is outside the scope of this article to suggest a specific 
mechanism for implementing this choice, at a minimum, the ACO 
regulations need to incorporate provisions that commit Medicare 
beneficiaries to ACOs for some period of time so that the patients can be 
more actively engaged participants in their care. To the extent that CMS will 
make providers in an ACO responsible for cost containment and will pay 
based on outcome-driven data, CMS needs to provide assurances to these 
providers that the beneficiaries will work with the providers as participants in 
their own care.254 While quality metrics will encourage and incentivize 
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providers to encourage (and perhaps cajole) their patients to comply with 
medication regimens, stop smoking, eat better, etc., to be able to be 
successful as to outcomes with those patients and cost containment, the 
patient him or herself needs to be included in this process and work with 
providers towards those goals. 
Although Berwick is cautious about imposing restrictions on 
beneficiaries, incorporating some level of patient involvement that commits 
the patient to certain providers into the ACO structure would push the ACO 
scheme towards the Triple Aim, because it will enable providers to work 
more closely with the patient on achieving better care outcomes. 
Additionally, so long as the patients feel as if they are choosing to participate 
in such coordination, it will also improve the patient experience of care 
necessary under the Triple Aim. Likewise, if such a structure is successful, it 
should make lowering the per capita cost of healthcare under the ACO 
structure more feasible.255 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Over the last four years, many have claimed that, at its heart, the 
ACA is simply insurance reform.256 Behind the obvious insurance aspects of 
the law, however, the ACA is also attempting to reform the U.S. healthcare 
system to move towards providing better patient experience, delivering better 
healthcare for the entire population, and lowering the per patient cost of 
providing such care257; that is the Triple Aim.258 When this reform movement 
began (in fact, when the concept of the Triple Aim was first launched in 
2006), the greatest attention and focus rested on integrated systems such as 
the Mayo Clinic that were already operating efficiently and effectively.259 In 
attempting to recreate or model those structures, the ACA and its enacting 
agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, created ACOs, 
which are attempting to fulfill this Triple Aim by creating necessary financial 
incentives and disincentives that are designed to help hospitals and 
physicians work together in a manner that will enable them to function more 
like the Mayo Clinic.260 What is clear, however, is that while the ACO 
structure is creating alignment for some providers, it remains elusive and 
inaccessible for the very providers and systems that it was trying to emulate. 
                                                 
255 See Berwick, Making Good on ACOs’ Promise, supra note 241 
256 See Sage, supra note 6. 
257 By way of example, the CMS Innovation Center, created under § 1115A of the 
ACA (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315a), has a stated goal of providing better care for patients, 
better health for our communities, and lower costs. 
258 See Berwick, supra note 7, at 760. 
259 See OBAMA REMARKS, supra note 15. 
260 As discussed above, the MSSP and Pioneer ACO program attempt to align 
physicians and hospitals financially by allowing them to share savings to the extent that they 
can work together to reduce amounts paid by CMS on Medicare beneficiaries. See supra Part I 
(discussing the MSSP and Pioneer program). 
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Such inaccessibility indicates that the ACO structure is not achieving the 
goals of the Triple Aim that it set out to accomplish given that it perpetuates 
and solidifies the current fractured delivery system. 
Rather than a system that seems to be excluding leaders in care 
delivery such as the Mayo Clinic, Intermountain Health System, and Kaiser 
Permanente, the United States needs such systems to be leading the reform of 
the healthcare delivery system. Such leadership cannot exist only in the 
commercial sector, but needs to involve the use and participation of 
government programs such as Medicare. This is true because not only will 
doing so fulfill the balance necessary to achieve the Triple Aim, but also 
because government programs are the only programs that cross state borders. 
Unlike commercial insurance, which is most often limited to use by residents 
in the particular state of incorporation due to licensure laws, nearly every 
hospital in the country is a Medicare provider.261 Various systems across the 
country are stating that they are practicing accountable care and/or entering 
into alternative reimbursement contracts such as shared savings with 
insurance companies, even if not part of the MSSP or Pioneer ACO 
Program.262 With these sorts of trends, healthcare delivery reform 
movements will continue to be fractured and varied unless and until there is a 
system within the Medicare program that provides some consistency and is 
able to achieve that balance and better health management for an entire 
population as envisioned by Berwick and the IHI.263 For this reason, if the 
U.S. is to achieve the Triple Aim, focus must be paid to the ACO structure 
and to making that structure accessible to all. 
In order to create an ACO structure that is accessible and available to 
all, the structure must be revised in a way that will assure that it can attract 
and include all health systems, including academic medical centers and 
integrated delivery systems like the Mayo Clinic. Such reforms may not 
come easily, but it is critical to keep the process of development of ACOs 
and the ACO structure dynamic. This includes: adoption of more 
comprehensive payment reform systems, development and enactment of 
national quality standards that are attainable and realistic for all to achieve 
and that help spread the related costs of the teaching and research that often 
accompany high quality and innovation, and inclusion of Medicare 
beneficiaries in their care that will hold such beneficiaries accountable for 
their care along with their providers. The Triple Aim is still an attainable 
goal, but in order to keep moving towards that goal, much more needs to be 
                                                 
261 AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNDERPAYMENT BY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET 
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done with respect to the ACO structure that keeps the focus on the Triple 
Aim. 
